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This study explores the effects of income, insurance, and source 
of medical care on access to and utilization of health services. Pro-
files of dental, physician, and hospital services use are developed for 
more than 3,500 Oregonians. Low income, lack of health insurance, 
and/or an inappropriate source of medical care are hypothesized to be 
barriers to access and utilization. Households which face one or more 
of these barriers are identified as falling into a "Health Policy Gap." 
The data for this study were drawn from a 1978 random telephone 
survey of 1249 Oregon households. The survey was commissioned by the 
State Health Planning and Development Agency in conjunction with the 
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Northwest Oregon Health Systems Agency, the Western Oregon Health 
Systems Agency, and the Eastern Oregon Health Systems Agency. The 
questionnaire was developed by the Oregon State University Research 
Center. Information was collected on use of health services, insurance 
coverage, income, household structure, health needs, health behaviors, 
and health satisfaction. 
A behavioral model of health services utilization was constructed, 
dividing the independent variables according to their relative mutabil-
ity or amenity to policy intervention. Income, insurance, and source 
of care were selected as policy variables, while other variables less 
under policymakers' control were labelled household characteristics. 
The latter were assumed to reflect a household's propensity to consume 
services. They included household structure, health need, residential 
mobility, and health behaviors. Dependent variables included measures 
of dental and physician visits, use of the telephone for physician ad-
vice, preventive exams, and hospitalization during the past year. 
Multiple techniques of analysis were employed. Cross-tabular pro-
cedures were applied to investigate the interrelationship of income, 
insurance, and source of care. Multiple linear regression and partial 
correlation methods were used to select as control variables household 
characteristics highly correlated to each measure of health services use. 
Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis were used to 
develop profiles of health services use. These last techniques allowed 
an examination of the relationship of each policy variable and health 
measure while applying increasing levels of statistical control. The 
initial bivariate relationship was studied in isolation; it was then 
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studied while controlling for the other policy variables, and finally 
while controlling for both the other policy variables as well as 
selected household characteristic variables. 
Findings support the hypotheses. Income is found to be related 
to insurance coverage, and insurance coverage to source of medical care, 
although income is not found to be directly related to source of care. 
Low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical 
care depress use across almost all services. However, their relative 
barrier effects differ by the measure of service examined. After con-
trolling for the effects of household structure, health need, residential 
mobility, and health behaviors, the greatest disparity in use of dental 
services remains due to income, in physician services to insurance and 
income, and in hospital services to insurance. 
Clear implications arise for policymakers, whether in the public 
or private sectors. The low income, the uninsured, and those with an 
inappropriate source of care face real barriers to access. Since the 
relative magnitude of these barrier effects vary by the health measure 
examined, neither income, insurance, nor health system delivery strate-
gies can be assumed to evenly enhance use patterns. Their effects must 
be separately estimated for differing measures of health services. 
Furthermore, the relationship between these policy variables needs 
detailed study before large-scale policy interventions are undertaken. 
Understanding the complexity of these findings for different measures 
of health services as well as the interrelationship of income, health 
insurance, and source of care is crucial in designing and implementing 
more effective and equitable health policies in the future. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE HEALTH POLICY GAP: AN OVERVIEW 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A RIGHT OR A PRIVILEGE? 
A privilege is a right which is granted as a special 
favor. Privileges are inherently private matters. A right 
is a privilege which has been extended to all people, and the 
preservation and protection of that right becomes a public 
matter •••• If we, as a people, declare that access to 
health care is a right, then private medicine becomes a 
public matter and the right of access must be protected just 
as is our right to a basic education or freedom of speech. 
We have not yet made access to needed m~dical care a right in 
this country. Not in law, and not in practice. We have said 
it, and declared it, and even tried to promise it, but until 
we make it a legally enforceable right ••• it will remain, 
in practice, a privilege. l 
In this country, there is a growing consensus that all Americans 
have a right to at least a minimum level of health care. 2 This is a 
conse~'~ence of several developments within the past two decades which 
include the public's increased expectations of modern medicine's 
miracles, their demand for relief from the spiraling costs of health 
care, and the widespread view that government is responsible for 
ensuring health care to the needy.3 Opinion polls demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of this belief; they show that the majority of Americans 
accept the concept of national health insurance and insist on the 
federal government's accepting primary responsibility for ending 
poverty. Paradoxically, these sentiments coexist with the convictions 
that any able-bodied person who wants to can provide for himself and 
that Americans should rely more heavily on individual initiative and 
less on gover~~ent programs. 4 Ambivalence, in terms of individual 
2 
versus collective responsibilities towards the needy, is an underlying 
theme in the American value system. 
within the context of a diffuse success ideology, the adult 
population discriminates among welfare state policies. If the 
beneficiaries seem to work for it (earnings-based pensions, 
prepaid medical insurance) it is good, and big majorities of the 
respondents in national cross section samples generally support an 
actual or proposed program. If the benefit is unearned or 
perceived as unearned (AFDC, unemployment compensation), it is bad 
and majorities typically reject the program. 5 
HISTORICAL TRENDS: GROWTH OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INSURANCE 
Expansion of Private Health Insurance 
Two trends have influenced Americans' access to hee:~. \ :are: the 
expansion of private insurance and the advent of public : nce for 
certain groups of the low income and elderly. The former, 1n 
particular, has played a major role in changing the American 
household's use of health services. Since the 1940's, health insurance 
coverage is estimated to have expanded by nearly six times -- from 15% 
to 88%.6 Employer-provided health insurance programs provide 
mainstream access to health care for the majority of Americans. 
Accompanying the growth in private insurance coverage is the 
establishment of public insurance programs designed to protect the 
disadvantaged. 
3 
Public Health Insurance Programs 
The advent of Medicaid and Medicare in the 1960's has reduced 
existing financial barriers to the 49 million poor and elderly 
estimated eligible for coverage under these programs. 7 Eligible 
households are generally either those headed by poor females with 
dependent children, those including persons 65 years of age or older, 
or those containing disabled persons. Entrance of the millions of 
publicly insured to the health marketplace has contributed to the 
escalating costs and rising levels of demand for health services. 8 
Unfortunately, the growth of private insurance and the start of public 
insurance programs may well only worsen existing barriers to access for 
households which are unable to obtain private coverage and ineligible 
for Medicaid and Medicare. 
Present patterns of public insurance eligibility are best 
understood by considering the history of social welfare program growth 
in the United States. Increasingly, government has intervened to 
provide food, shelter, and medical care to the needy through 
disbursement of cash and also through in-kind social programs (e.g., 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Social Security, Foodstamps, 
Medicare, and Medicaid). These programs indicate society's commitment 
to provide a social safety net to protect its members against the 
unpredictability and devastation of such catastrophes as death, 
disability, and divorce. However, society encourages its members to 
attempt to be self-sufficient before seeking aid; therefore, a system 
of health care has evolved in which the majority of households are 
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assured access to health care by employer-provided insurance. Those 
needy eligible for public insurance are enabled access through Medicare 
or Medicaid, and the remaining needy get by as best they can. 
Two facts are important in understanding why public insurance 
programs protect some types of needy households while purposely 
excluding others. These are the categorical eligibility requirements 
of the early social welfare programs to which Medicare and Medicaid 
eligibility are linked. The incremental and unrestrained growth of 
these social programs over time has culminated in today's fragmented 
and exlusionary system of public health insurance. 
Incremental Growth. In December of 1974, the Subcommittee on 
Fiscal policy of the Joint Economic Committee made the following 
assessment: 
The current cr~s~s in social 
mushrooming growth of an array 
inaugurated at different times 
means of different strategies. 
have created a system built on 
welfare policy is due to the 
of programs that were 
to meet specific problems by 
A series of piecemeal efforts 
conflicting principles. 9 
The first of these programs was the Social Security Act of 1935. It 
began a movement away from a laissez-faire philosophy and towards what 
has been termed the welfare state. Social Security depended on the 
theory of social insurance to protect workers and their familites 
against the financial ravages of retirement, disability, and death. 
The program was originally based on the principle of assigning benefits 
according to the amount the worker had earned. Almost immediately this 
principle was compromised by the concept of need-equity, which adjusted 
the worker's earnings-based benefit level by the number of dependents. 
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Certain other groups judged unable to support themselves (e.g., the 
blind, the disabled, and the children of disabled or deceased workers), 
were later included. lO Today's Social Security program illustrates 
, the historical ambivalence of society towards benefit level adequacy 
versus work incentives, as well as the conflict between equal help for 
equal need versus differential rewards for past work and saving. ll 
Cate90rical Eligibility. Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) was the first,purely need-based social welfare program. It 
provided a model for other categorical programs. Generally speaking, 
only women with young children qualified for benefits. Eligibility was 
affected by race, family structure, and judgments by program staff of 
applicants' morality. Not until 1948, for example, did Black 
households appear on the welfare rolls in any number, whatever their 
family structure or financial need. 12 unmarried mothers, or those 
with nonmarital relationships, and male-headed households were often 
summarily excluded. Even today, only one half of the states offer 
benefits to male-headed families, regardless of financial need. 13 
The exclusion of households who do not fit narrow categories of 
eligibility for Social Security and AFDC has been carried over to 
Medicare and Medicaid requirements. The original programs excluded 
some of the needy so as to enhance work effort for noneligible 
households, cut program costs, and enhance the political viability of 
the programs involved. 14 Medicaid was intended to serve those 
households eligible for AFDC, while Medicare focused on individuals 
eligible for Social Security. 
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The Health policy Gap. The unhappy result of fragmented social 
welfare program growth and exclusionary eligibility requirements for 
such programs is that a sizeable number of financially needy American 
households are now left in a health policy gap. Households headed by a 
working adult, by two parents, or by those barely above the official 
poverty line are penalized for their efforts to be self-sufficient, to 
provide a stable family structure, and to avoid stigmatizing social 
programs such as ~'lelfare, 15 Twelve percent of all Americans, or 
twenty-four million people, are estimated to be without health 
. 16. . 1nsurance. In Oregon, th1s 12% represents approx1mately 250,000 
people of all ages. l ? The history of social welfare program growth 
has helped create this Health Policy Gap, and the pressures of New 
Federalism and the economic recession have widened it. 
THE PRESENT: NEW FEDERALISM, RECESSION, AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY 
New Federalism 
President Reagan's inaugural speech clearly articulates the 
concept of New Federalism: 
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the 
Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the 
distinction between the powers granted to the federal 
government and those reserved to the states or people. All 
of us need to be reminded that the Federal government did not 
create the states; the states created the Federal 
government. 18 
A national economic recession and the Administration's emphasis on a 
balanced federal budget, in conjunction with New Federalism, means that 
at least the immediate future holds little promise for increased 
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spending on health care for the needy. The explosive growth of social 
programs in the past two decades and the concurrent inadequate 
utilization and cost controls on Medicaid and Medicare programs have 
led to disenchantment with the goals of social opportunity and 
increased equity. As a result, the trend of policymaking has recently 
shifted in the direction of fiscal conservatism and an "If-I-can-make-
it,-you-can-make-it" attitude towards the poor. Cost containment has 
become the potent rallying cry used by conservative forces in Congress 
to fight social welfare spending. 
Block Grants. President Reagan stated in 1981 that block grants 
consolidation would be used to cut subsidies to regional and local 
government as a means of reducing wasteful administrative overhead and 
to give state and local government more autonomy.l9 A key objective 
of the block grant proposals was to lessen federal involvement in and 
control over program design and delivery. This, it was reasoned, would 
give state and local governments more flexibility, authority, and 
responsibility within broad federal guidelines. 20 As signed by the 
President, the Act combines over twenty health care programs into seven 
block grants with an overall twenty-five percent reduction in 
funding. 21 
Funding Cuts. Administration officials contended that some of the 
losses in funding to the states would be offset by administrative 
savings due to decreased federal red tape. Table I compares the 
Administration's original two block grant proposals with those 
eventually adopted by the Congress. 
J'lU':.!j J IJ(~rrt' '!.l l'U(JI'CJ!iAI.!; 
',".n odn.tniulcattuu 1J[(Jl.ltJUl.!d 
l;f.lflUOl1,lalitm uf l~ I'CUfJ[aInU 
Jr.lu a aLl hilliun ul.Jlc 
·JICllll. l'nJOlJcamu tncltllJoC; 
W'ICfJ community IIcolth Ct:ntL!'u, 
HicJcolit lIu."Jlth, t)norC)(!Ocy Moeli-
c • .,l !;cJ[vlcOH, Hunta] lIeo..llth, 
AIt;c,hlJl alltJ 1" II') AlHJUt: !icc-
vic:fJlJ, IJlack I.llncl Clinil.'u, 
1I1.1nClI'II111.1, Gnd !jluldcn J .:-
• lIlIt. Ul10lth UYfUt(()IhU (UlU!;) ~ 
'I'hl~ ucJIIlJnllJlcl1tiun pCOIJ()ucd 
c(fllUl)lid ... tion of 10 prucJrdmu 
lr'l" a $16U ",1111011 utdtu 
'Ir~ll1l. Covurod I'lu<J[4lnu WecO 
lIudulll Conl1ul, i-'uml1y 1'1<111-
11111'J, IIlt)1! Jlluod l'cuuulJre 
('!llIlro), IIc,'lJth Incontivl' 
I:rolllu, Itlllk Ih .... Juc;tJon lInrl 
III'allh Educdliun, i-'Illur id .... -
t lOll, I.,'.ul UalJucI I'~,dlll, 
Vt!I1UIIlUl IJ I tltliUIl~U, (;cIWl ic: 
l_lloc',·uHlu, l1ml I\clulow:(!I1t 
lit,,, It It !ic~r v 1 CUll. 
T/JlLE I 
I;(J)CK GllAlrr PI<OPOSALS - IIt:AL'I11 22 
IlEA1.TII SERVICes 
S~ljA1'E 
5oiff1(! as aclmlnititr aticlO pcopo-
Dal exc~pt that the Maternal 
alld Child Health, Homophilia, 
iJOO SIOS pcog:ams W~[C placed 
III different block grants. 
!itatcs would receive a share 
of the block 9rant proportional 
to the amou"t that they and en-
t1tleu In LtC stilte received in 
f'Y 1981 • 
HOUSE 
The House did not recommend 
a lIeallh block grant compar-
able to the one proposed by 
the administration or the 
Senate. It did provide for 
an Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
block grant--consolidating 
five alcohol and drug abuse 
categorical programs. 
PHI..vEIITIVE IlEALTH SERVICes 
All pr<>qrams proposed by the 
Prcoidellt except for Lead 
Oa:lcd I'ainl and Genetic Di8-
ea~eu were included. These 
two p(()(JriJm5 were consolidated 
in ttl£! Moltcrnai and Child 
lIealth Ulock Granl. 
lIealth Incentive Grants risk 
reduction, Rodent Control 
and Fluoridation were 
consolidated. 
CONFERENCE CClIMI'M'EE 
The Conference Conunittee agreed 
to an Alcohol, Drug Abuse and 
Mental Health block grant, a 
primary care block grant, and a 
maternal and child health block 
grant. Ten health programs, in-
cluded in the President's grant 
proposals were authorized cate-
gorical programs. 
The Conference Committee consol-
idated Home Health, Rodent Control, 
Fluoridation, lIealth Education, and 
Risk Reduction, Health Incentive 
Grants, Emergency Medical Services 
Rape Crisis, and Hypertension. 
Immunization, Tuberculosis, Vener-
eal Disease and Family Planning 
Were reauthorized as categorical 
grants. 
co 
Attempts to cut existing levels of funding for Medicare and Medicaid 
have alarmed many congressmen. Proposed administration cuts brought 
this response, for example, from Oregon Representative, Ron Wyden: 
Flying in the face or reason, the Administration has 
proposed slashing some $2.2 billion from Medicaid and some 
$2.5 billion from Medicare in 1983 ••• the Administration 
has once again ignored the prescription for long-term 
recovery, preferring the meat-axe approach that will only 
shift the burden of health care onto the shoulders of senior 
citizens, the needy and health care providers. 
The Medicare system is • • • in the red because the federal 
government has perpetuated a perverse reimbursement system 
that actually rewards waste and inefficiency • • • • We hand 
health care providers a blank check to fill in after the care 
is provided, rather than negotiating reasonable health care 
packages in advance.23 
In 1982, almost $325 million was slashed from reimburserrlents to 
9 
hospitals for Medicare and Medicaid patients, reducing payments to only 
85% of the cost of medical care given the poor and elderly under these 
24 programs. Such losses are shifted, at least in part, to the costs 
of privately insured patients and to those households without insurance 
coverage. Because the primary responsibility for serving the health 
care needs of the poor has historically been left to state and local 
governments, the effects of block grants and reduced funding have put 
these policymakers into a moral and economic quandry. 
State and Local Impacts 
State Funding. Under the rubric of new federalism and consumer 
sovereignty, the importance of social services has been de-emphasized 
by the federal government; absolute decreases in resource transfers 
have accompanied the de-emphasis. In Oregon, these reductions in the 
10 
availability of federal monies have occurred as revenue sources have 
become outstripped by an upswing in demand for services and surging 
health care costs. These factors in combination significantly decrease 
state and local governments' ability to meet even existing levels of 
need. 
During the 1981 Oregon Legislative Session, the Department of 
Human Resources attempted to address federal funding reductions for 
social service programs in the amount of $118.7 million dollars. 25 
(A preliminary estimate of Oregon's 1982 block grant authorization is 
found in Table II). The state's initial strategy was to attempt to 
replace reduced federal monies with General State Funds. Even as 
replaced by general funds health, block monies for primary health care, 
alcohol/drugs and mental health, preventive health, and child health 
were diminished by approximately 25%. Absolute decreases in revenue 
transfers for health care by the federal government have drastically 
lessened existing health care access for Oregon's needy. 
Local Responsibility. Inflationary forces may now be the 
strongest the health care system has faced since the early 1930's.26 
The danger exists that with the growth of a medically indigent 
population, the current system will eventually collapse. Don 
Schictman, Director of the State Medicaid program, states: 
The questions now being raised ·:ire not simply what level of 
care the poor can expect, or who should shoulder the costs of 
providing it. The question is, how do we keep the health 
care system from collapsing. 27 
State and local governments are restricted in their ability to cover 
federal revenue shortfalls by a combination of constitutional 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
* 
TABLE II 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF OREGON'S BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATION 
FFY 1982 AT THE AUTHORIZATION LEVEL 28 
Estimated Allocations 
Oregon's Share Current Block 
of Current Programs Grant 
Blocks Programs IT.J 1981 FFY 1982 
Social Services 1.162 33.186m 27.736m 
AID & Mental Health 0.905 5.775m 4.444m 
Energy 1.245 22.123m 23.346m 
Primary Health Care 1.670 * 5.428m 5.052m 
Community Services 0.846 3.182m 2.999m 
Preventive Health 1.045 1.359m .993m 
Maternal & Child Health 1.185 5.049m 3.758m 
76.702m 68.326m 
Under 
% 
Chanqes 
-16.4 
-23.0 
+ 2.7 
- 6.9 
- 5.8 
-26.9 
-25.6 
-10.9 
States cannot administer the Primary Health Care program during FFY 1982; 
the figure shown is the FFY 1983 authorization level. 
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limitations on raising the property tax, practical enforcement 
restraints on the income tax, and constituent unwillingness to impose a 
regressive sales tax. These revenue inelasticities are exacerbated by 
increased rates of unemployment, failures of businesses, and escalating 
costs of health care. The results are that many Oregon households now 
face even greater financial barriers to obtaining necesary health care 
than they faced in the recent past. 
Locally, Multnomah County's problems illustrate the situation of 
local government in meeting the responsibility of health care for the 
medically indigent. Currently, this demand seems insurmountable. With 
a 6% annual increase cap on property taxes, the County's main revenue 
source, it is virtually impossible for revenues to keep pace with 
current rates of inflation and increased demand. Unemployment rates 
(9.8% in ~ugust of 1982) are some of the highest since such records 
29 have been collected. Reductions in federal funding are passed on 
to local government. Local government, unable to meet these costs, 
ultimately places the burden on the shoulders of providers with 
negative implications for the disadvantaged's access to health care. 
Provider Cost Shifts. In recent years, hospital write-offs for 
charity, bad debts, and inadequate reimbursement by Medicaid and 
M d " h be " dOl 30 h h" e lcare ave en growlng stea 1 y. Nort west area ospltals have 
seen losses rise from 6.1% in 1974 to 16% in 1981. 31 In 1981, losses 
from these factors totalled $94 million, a $19 million increase over 
previous years. The Northwest Oregon Council of Hospitals estimates 
that cost shifts (efforts by providers to pass along such costs to 
private patients) have added $150-$170 per day to the bill of 
13 
. 1· d . 32 prlvate y-lnsure patlents. 
The elderly, the poor, and the unemployed tend to be concentrated 
in urban areas, and therefore inner city hospitals bear the brunt of 
such losses; suburban hospitals remain relatively unaffected. 
Hospitals' alternatives are to shift additional costs to private 
patients, cut personnel, institute prepayment practices, eliminate high 
cost, technologically intensive programs (e.g. neonatal care), and 
eventually turn those who cannot pay away from their doors. 33 In 
many areas of the United states, the urban-poor/suburban-rich dichotomy 
has already created two hospital systems.34 
The plight of Emanuel Hospital illustrates the seriousness of the 
crisis. An inner-city hospital attempting to meet the needs of its 
area's poor and elderly, Emanuel is hard hit. Cost shifts per day are 
over $226, increasing the bill for one day of hospitalization to $587 
dollars. With 62% of its patient population insured by Medicaid and 
Medicare, this hospital is currently forced to shift almost 22% of its 
revenues or $14 million dollars annually. By January 1981, Emanuel's 
losses on care given the poor were $9.7 million dollars. Hospital 
administrators implemented the following strategies to cOI}nter 
anticipated fiscal year deficits: laying off 158 employees, cancelling 
the building program, forbidding elective surgery without prepayment, 
and seriously considering the elimination of several programs. Rising 
unemployment had already caused the number of patients obtaining 
elective surgery to drop almost 40% from the same period the year 
before, as households lost employer-provided health insurance and 
suffered reductions in the ability to pay for care out-of-pocket. 35 
14 
Implications for the future of health services delivery are 
ominous. The question raised by administrators of hospitals such as 
Emanuel is, "At what point can these costs no longer by shifted onto 
the private sector?"36 Blue Cross and OPS Blue Shield, the state's 
two largest insurance carriers (now in the process of consolidation), 
pay the bulk of these cost shifts to private patients. Blue Cross of 
Oregon lost $4.9 million in 1981 and has subsequently announced rate 
increases of 20-50%. A spokesperson states that Blue Cross is pricing 
itself out of the market. This observation seems borne out as 
employers seek lower-cost employee benefit packages; and the 
unemployed, unable to self-insure, join the swelling ranks of other 
households in the health policy gap. 
In summary, need in the American system of social welfare, is not 
now and never has been the sale determinant of eligibility for 
assistance. Access to health care is ensured for those with 
employer-provided private insurance coverage, assured for those needy 
who are eligible for Medicaid or Medicare, and ignored for those needy 
who are not eligible for public insurance. This historical background 
provides a perspective from which to examine access and equity issues 
in health care for Oregon households in the Health policy Gap. 
15 
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CHAPTER II 
J. MODEL FOR HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a behavioral model of 
health services utilization. For policymakers, the potential of a 
behavioral model lies in its delineation of causal patterns and the 
subsequent increased understanding and prediction of patterns of human 
behavior. Empirical testing of such a model allows inferences to be 
drawn from the data which may ultimately lead to increased control over 
the occurrence of natural events. No model, however, exists outside a 
larg6~ and more complex system of synergistic cause and effect, a 
system composed of decisionmakers frequently at crosspurposes about 
values, goals, and the means to those goals. 
Models attempting to explain the relationship between various 
correlates and utilization of health services can be placed in one of 
three general categories, depending upon where the locus of 
responsibility for utilization is put: on the individual, on system 
factors, or on the joint interaction of the individual and system 
factors. l 
Individual Characteristics Models 
The perspective which emphasizes the importance of the 
individual's characteristics on use of health services is typified by 
the Health Belief Model. 2 This model assumes a sequential behavioral 
decision process wherein the individual perceives, evaluates, and 
responds to symptoms. Threats of illness are weighed against the 
19 
benefits of obtaining treatment in order to make decisions about use of 
services. Given an individual's particular set of symptoms and 
social-structural characteristics, four key elements affect the 
decision to act: 
1) health motivations which represent differences in concern 
for health matters; 
2) the threat posed by the symptoms, including physical harm 
and possible interference with daily functioning; 
3) benefits, efficacy, or value of actions to reduce the 
threat; and 
4) costs of or barriers to the action. 3 
In related work, stoeckle, Zola, and Davidson (1963) conclude that 
a patient's decision to seek medical care in response to symptoms 
depends on the objective clinical disorder, the patient's perceptions, 
knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about the symptoms; attitudes and 
expectations of the phYSician and medical system; definitions of health 
and sickness;-dnd the point at which medical care becomes necessary.4 
A global model of medical services utilization is proposed by 
Suchman (1965). He suggests that the degree of social group 
organization and the medical orientation of an individual are directly 
related to differences in patterns of medical services use. 5 He 
describes social group organization as varying from parochial to 
cosmopolitan, while he sees medical orientation as depending on the 
individual's cognitive knowledge about disease, affective skepticism 
about medical care, and behavioral dependency during illness. 6 
Suchman links parochial social group organization and nonscientific 
medical care orientation, concluding that both are major causes of 
, , '1" 7 1nappropr1ate ut1 1zat10n. Kosa and Robertson (1969) also emphasize 
the influence of ~he individual's family, friends, and other lay 
advisors in the analysis of and response to illness symptoms. Their 
model includes cultural, situational, and interactional patterns. 8 
Fabrega (1973) uses a sequential model to outline behavioral 
process stages associated with illness. This model assumes that 
symptoms are interpreted through the person's individual taxonomy and 
that the person is rational and prefers an illness-free condition. 9 
Decisionmaking behavioral stages include illness recognition, 
assessment of the costs and benefits of treatment, selection of 
treatment, and the recycling of information for the next episode of 
illness behavior. 10 
Structural/Ecological Models 
20 
A second category of models places the locus of decisionmaking and 
responsibility for utilization primarily on structural factors--the 
necological and functional relationships between economic or community 
resources and the recipients of services. nIl Access, or the 
individual's ability to obtain health services when and where needed, 
is often an implicit or explicit concern. These models emphasize the 
demand-inducing or demand-suppressing effects of structural variables 
12 
on health services use. The structural/ecological approach 
stresses, among others, the following factors: 
• methods of financing (insurance coverage, prepayment, 
deductibles, co-insurance, fee-for-service, etc.), 
• geographic variables (distance and availability), and 
• organizational resources (facilities and range, quality, 
scope, and coordination of services).13 
Methods of financing are the major thrust of models emphasizi~g 
21 
demand theory in health services utilization. The effects of insurance 
types, elasticities of demand, and national health insurance on use of 
~ervices are common emphases of these models. 14 Other research 
examines the effects of public insurance on access to health services 
for the poor. IS 
Other structural/ecological research examines geographic factors 
and organizational resources as influences on health services use. 16 
Source of medical care (outpatient or emergency room treatment versus 
services of a private physician) has been found to vary by social 
class. Geographical distance and services availability are also 
related to patterns of utilization. 
Holistic, or Joint Interaction Models 
The third category of behavior models assumes utilization to be a 
joint function of factors both internal and external to the 
individual. 17 This holistic approach is typified by Andersen's 
(1968) model of health services utilization and Andersen and Newman's 
(1973) framewor.k for viewing health services utilization. lS This 
type of model incorporates the following concepts: 
• an economic emphasis upon the family as the unit of 
analysis~ 
• separation of economic and social factors~ 
• analysis of separate types of health services~ 
• inclusions of perceptions of health and illness~ and 
• specification of causal paths leading to health service 
use. 19 
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This model posits that a family's use of health services depends on its 
predisposition to use them, its ability to secure them, and its need 
for them (see Figure 1). 
PREDISPOSING ---..;:>~ ENABLING ----~--..:;>:;. NEED -----...,;>~ USE 
Family Composition Family Resources Illness 
Social Structure Community Resources Response 
Health Beliefs 
Figure 1. A behavioral model of families' use of health 
services. 20 
Andersen finds that predisposing and enabling components are more 
useful in explaining the utilization of discretionary services (such as 
dental), while the need component figures largest for nondiscretionary 
uses (for example, hospital and physician services) .21 
The behavioral model of health services utilization focuses on the 
interplay of factors--both external and internal--which affect 
families' use of health services. The model is placed within a larger 
context by Andersen and Newman's framework for viewing health services 
utilization (see Figure 2.) 
SOCIETAL DETERMINANTS .oE(~-------->~ HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 
Technology 
Norms 
INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS 
(Behavioral Model) 
Predisposing 
Enabling 
Illness Level 
~ 
Resources 
Organization 
HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION 
Type 
Purpose 
Unit of Analysis 
Figure 2. A framework for viewing health services utilization. 22 
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This framework postulates reciprocal causal links between societal 
determinants, the health services system and individual determinants, 
i.e., each affects, and in turn is affected by, the others. Societal 
determinants are subdivided in the model into technology and norms. 
Norms are reflected, not only through legislation, but also through 
society's converging beliefs and opinions, as, for example, the 
emerging belief that all Americans have a right to health care. The 
health services system is perceived as being divided into resources 
(including the volume and distribution of labor and capital) and 
organization, which involves both access (system entry) and structure 
(system characteristics which determine what happens to the patient 
following entry).23 
THE POOR: A SPECIAL CASE OF HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION 
Andersen's (1969) and Andersen and Newman's (1973) research work 
together constitute a systems model of health services utilization. 
Ecological, organizational, and individual factors are integrated 
within the model. Some factors are relatively constant and 
unchangeable from a policy perspective, while others are more policy 
mutable and therefore more likely to be under the control of 
policymakers. For the disadvantaged, variables emerge as important 
determinants of access which are of little import for other types of 
households. For example, Davis and Reynolds (1975) develop a model of 
utilization for the publicly insured that includes not only patient 
characteristics, but also physician preferences for certain kinds of 
patients, and features of public insurance programs which vary by 
24 
state. 
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Seeking an explanation for the lower use of health services by the 
poor, Dutton (197~) looks at the i~pact of financial coverage, the 
culture of poverty, and systems barriers to health services use. 25 
Each of these explanations has been presented as a reason why the poor 
use fewer health services than do others. Noting disputes over the 
relative importance of financial versus health system barriers, 
Lefcowitz (1973) notes, "Whichever side of the argument is taken, two 
'facts' are accepted as true: 1) poverty leads to less medical care; 
and 2) poverty results in diminished health."26 
The Culture of Poverty Explanation 
Perhaps the most insidious in its implications for policyma~ing is 
25 
Lewis' (1966) theory of the culture of poverty. Lewis suggests that 
poverty is an intergenerational phenomenon, handed down as a collection 
of adaptive and reactive responses by the poor to their social and 
economic situations. Socioeconomic characteristics of the individual 
are seen as causing inappropriate use of health services, which in turn 
leads to poor health. policy implications of the acceptance of this 
theory verge on what Ryan (1971) labels as "blaming the victim."27 
Zola (1973) places responsibility for inappropriate delays in 
obtaining medical care on 
• • • a list of faults--the patient has no time, no money 
••• is of lower education, socioeconomic status, or an ethnic 
or racial minority. As the researchers might put it, there is 
something about these people or in their backgrounds which has 
disturbed their rationality, for otherwise they would 
"naturally" seek aid. 28 
This approach assumes that the individual is irrational and at fault 
for not using medical services appropriately. No consideration is 
given to barriers to appropriate use due to environmental factors 
outside the individual's control. Fixed individual characteristics 
(religion, ethnicity, race) are lumped together with factors which are 
more mutable. The inference that culture alone accounts for low use of 
health services by the poor places the blame directly on those least 
able to help themselves. It may also lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that individual characteristics should be the major focus of policy 
interventions, while important environmental and structural factors are 
perceived as immutable. Hyman (1970), for example, concludes that by 
• • • reducing fatalism and discontent, or establishing lay 
referral networks where none yet exist, an increase in 
utilization can be effected without dealing directly with the 
economic poverty variable which is antecedent to these 
variables. 29 
26 
Financial/Systems Barriers Explanations 
Both financial and system barrier explanations place the major 
responsibility for inappropriate use of health services of the poor 
primarily on the environmental/ecological/structural context within 
which this group functions. The financial barrier explanation posits 
that poor people, given financial access, can ultimately "express their 
demand in the medical marketplace, and that this demand will then 
attract a sufficient supply of health producers."30 Source of care, 
distance from a health care facility, and quality of care are perceived 
as creating barriers to system use by the poor. In examining cultural, 
financial, and systems access explanations, Dutton (1978) finds that 
income-related factors, especially the type of health system used, play 
a greater role (at least for discretionary care) than do inadequate 
financial coverage and negative attitudes towards health care. 3l 
Separately considered, the cultural, financial, and system 
barriers explanations are inadequate. The weakness of each of these 
explanations lies in the attempt to ignore the interaction of internal 
and external forces on ind5.vidual consumption patterns. 
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION 
This study developes a model based on an extensive litelature 
review of variables correlated to health services use. Income, health 
insurance coverage, and appropriateness of usual source of medical care 
are selected as policy mutable variables. Their effects on Health 
Policy Gap households are examined, both singly and in combination. 
Utilization profiles are compared for dental, physician, and hospital 
services. 
Variables are classified into three types: measures of 
utilization, household characteristics, and policy variables. The 
relative individual and combined effects of lower income, lack of 
health insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical care are 
hypothesized to act as barriers to utilization of health services by 
Health policy Gap households. 
The Model 
27 
The model postulates a causal process wherein the effects of 
household characteristics (household structure, occupation, residential 
mobility, health behaviors, and health need) on use of health services 
are mediated by the above-mentioned policy variables. In an equitable 
health care system, the influences of the policy variables on health 
service use should be negligible. Differences proceeding from 
household characteristics unrelated to system or structural barrier 
effects remain a matter of consumer preference or taste. Differences 
in health services use attributable to system or structural barriers, 
however, are determined to be the basis 'for policy interventions (see 
Figure 3). 
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HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS ~ POLICY VARIABLES ~UTILIZATION 
1. Household Structure 1. Income Type: 
2. Health Need 2. Health Insur- a. Dental 
ance Coverage 
3. Residential Mobility 3. Appropriateness b. Physician 
of Usual Source 
4. Health Behaviors of Medical Care 
c. Hospital 
Figure 3. The causal sequence of household health services 
utilization. 
Lower Income ---.....,>~ Lack of Health ---->~ Inappropriate Source 
Insurance on Medical Care 
Figure 4. Barriers to health service utilization by "Health 
policy Gap" households. 
Health Services Use 
Use of health services is the dependent or outcome variable. 
Access to health care is defined as use of health services after 
controlling for the effects of differing levels of need for 
services. 32 Dental, physician, and hospital services use are 
considered separately. To arrive at an empirical estimate of access, 
health need is treated as an independent variable whose effects on the 
dependent variable are controlled for, thereby insuring that higher 
levels of need associated with low income will not obscure the overall 
patterns of use. 
Dental, physician, and hospital services are assumed to vary in 
terms of the discretionary control afforded the consumer. The 
29 
household is perceived to retain most control or choice over the use of 
dental services, less for physician services, and least for hospital 
services, if every other factor remains constant. The policy variables 
combined with household characteristics should have more explanatory 
power for those services where the consumer retains the most choice. 
This may result from the consumer's perception of some services as less 
immediately health- or life-threatening than others (such as dental or 
preventive services) and from differences in the degree of provider 
control over the extent, duration, and quality of services used (see 
Figure 5). 
Dental Services 
I 
Physician Services 
I 
Hospital Services 
I > < 
CONSUMER CONTROL PROVIDER CONTROL 
Figure 5. Consumer/provider control over utilization by type of 
health service. 33 
Rates of use for various health services are analyzed both for 
individuals and, when appropriate, for households. Dental services use 
is defined as the number of times each household member has seen a 
dentist during the preceding twelve months. Use of physician services 
is measured by the number of times such services are reported as being 
used, either by in-person visits, telephone calls, or use of preventive 
exams (blood pressure, blood sugar, Pap Smear, breast, or prostate). 
The Independent Variables 
Eight independent variables are chosen for their relevance to 
utilization. They are divided into household characteristics and 
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policy variables. Household characteristics are hypothesized to 
reflect the propensity of the household to need or use services and are 
used as control measures. They include household structure, 
residential mobility, health behaviors, and reported health need. 
Policy variables, chosen for their relative mutability or amenability 
to wide-scale policy intervention, include income, insurance coverage, 
and appropriateness of source of medical care. Low income, lack of 
health insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical care are the 
hypothesized predicted inhibitors of appropriate health services use. 
Household Characteristics 
Household Structure. Household structure includes measures of 
members' ages, gender, and household size. 34 This variable is 
included to specify stages in the life cycle of households and to 
determine associated needs for health care. Both the very young and 
very old, for example, are high users of health services. 35 
Household size and use of health services are also related: as size 
increases, average rates of service use tend to level off. 36 Family 
size and number of restricted due to illness disability days together 
have been found to contribute almost 30% of the total variation in 
physician services use. 37 Gender is also found to influence health 
services use. For example, females in the child-bearing years consume 
more health services than do males. 38 
Health Need. Measures of health need include reported health 
conditions of household members, number of disability days reported in 
the past twelve months due to ill health, and the respondent's rating 
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of and general satisfaction with the household's health. Need is the 
strongest predictor of differences in families' use of health 
services. Number of disability days is the best predictor of families' 
total use of health services. 39 This also holds true for individual 
use of services: the more disability days an individual reports, the 
more likely that individual is to seek a physician's services. 40 
Residential Mobility. Residential mobility is measured by the 
number of years the household has lived both in the community and in 
its current dwelling unit. Mobility is included as an indicator of 
lifestyle, and higher rates of residential mobility are positively 
associated with higher rates of social and cultural mobility. Social 
and cultural mobility have been correlated with higher rates of disease 
and conditio:ns such as coronary heart disease, complications of 
pregnancy and depression. 41 
Health B,ehaviors. Measures of health behavior include the 
frequency and quantity of alcohol consumption, quantity of cigarettes 
smoked, and amount of regular exercise by at least one household 
member. Generally speaking, health behaviors are those behaviors which 
reflect the individual's attitudes towards health maintenance and which 
are assumed to affect health. They may have a negative impact (such as 
smoking or excessive alcohol consumption) or a positive impact (such as 
regular exercise).42 
The policy Variables 
This study examines the effects of three possible barriers--low 
income, lack of health insurance, and an inappropriate source of 
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care--on services use. Households facing one or more of these barriers 
are hypothesized to use fewer health services than households not 
facing such barriers. Exceptions occur as a function of unique 
characteristics of the health care system or of the household in 
question. A low income household eligible for public insurance, for 
example, may face no financial barrier in obtaining health services. A 
household with certain antihealth care beliefs, sufficient resources, 
and/or extremely high levels of health may prefer to handle its health 
care expenses on an out-of-pocket basis or to utilize alternative lay 
sources of health care. Household numbers may lack an appropriate 
source of care because they have recently moved to a new area, because 
they are dissatisfied with known health care sources, or simply because 
they do not feel a need for health care. In general, however, the 
factors of low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source 
of care, both singly and in combination, are hypothesized to comprise 
substantial barriers to the use of health services. 
Income. Four income groups are used for purposes of comparison: 
low income (households grossing less than $10,000 in 1977), lower 
middle income (households with a gross income in 1977 or $10,000 to 
$14,999), upper middle income (households in the $15,000 to $24,999 
range for 1977), and high income (households grossing more than $25,000 
in 1977).43 The low income are found to experience higher levels of 
sickness and mortality than higher income groups. Findings suggest 
that income plays an important role in the severity of health 
conditions of the poor and in their lower levels of health services 
use. Those in the lower classes have historically had lower life 
expectancies and higher death rates than other socio-economic 
groups.44 Even today, mortality rates for the poor run four times 
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higher than the national average for persons under twenty-five years of 
45 
age. Illness conditions reported by those below the poverty line 
are found to be serious more often than those by other segments of the 
population. 46 The poor are found to have far higher rates of heart 
disease, diabetes, hypertension, arthritis, rheumatism, visual 
impairments, liver and stomach problems, and other chronic health 
problems (especially long-term activity-restricting problems) .47 
Low income persons are initially found to use health services more 
frequently than middle income persons (see Figure 6). However, once 
rates of use are adjusted for need for health care, the pattern is 
transformed into one in which use of health services rises uniformly 
with income: i.e., the low income use least health services, the lower 
middle income use more, the upper middle income use even more, and the 
high income use most (see Figures 7 and 8). 
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Traditionally, lower rates of use for dental services still 
persist for the low income (see Figure 9). Recent data indicate that 
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low-income persons are only one-third as likely to see a dentist during 
a twelve-month period as are those in the highest income group.51 
The differences among the percentages of high, medium, and low 
income groups seeing a physician in a twelve-month period have 
decreased over time (see Figure 10). Use levels of both the middle and 
1 · h' d 52 ower 1ncome groups ave 1ncrease • The removal of financial 
barriers for a large portion of the poor through public health 
. t h h d . . t t 53 1nsurance appears 0 ave a a maJor 1mpac on access 0 care. 
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Historically, lower income groups have had lower hospital 
admission rates than higher income groups.56 However, this 
relationship has shown a reversal in the past few decades, largely due 
to the growth of health insurance and income transfer programs such as 
Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC).57 For the decade 
ending in 1973, data describing frequency of hospital use displayed a 
bimodal distribution, with both the high and low income groups being 
more substantial users than the middle income. 58 
Insurance. Health insurance categories are defined as uninsu!ed 
households (in which no member is insured) and insured households (in 
which at least one member is covered by health insurance). 
Two insurance trends have influenced health service use patterns 
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for American households: the expansion of private health insurance and 
the advent of public insurance for certain segments of the low income 
and the elderly. The expansion of private health insurance has played 
a major role in changing health service utilization patterns of the 
American household. Nationwide, health insurance coverage has expanded 
nearly six times, from 15% for hospital and surgical-medical in the 
1940's to 88% for all forms of health insurance in 1978. 59 
Estimates vary widely regarding the extent of coverage through 
private health insurance. For persons under the age of sixty-five, 
estimates range from 78% to 86% in 1976 (151 to 164 million insured 
60 persons). Evidence shows that approximately 32% of Medicaid 
eligibles in that year also had private insurance. Almost 40% of these 
were elderly persons who had both private and Medicare coverage. 6l 
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The advent of public health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid) in 
1965 reduced differences in use of medical services among income 
groups. Public insurance has significantly increased rates of health 
services use for the eligible poor compared with those poor either 
ineligible for public insurance or unwilling to apply for it (see 
Figure 11). Program data from 1976, however, show that only 40% of 
those eligible for Medicaid actually received benefits during the 
period of the study. The participation rate was judged to be even 
lower for the medically needy, with only 30% of the 6 million eligibles 
using benefits in states offering them. 62 
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Levels of health services use have been significantly increased by 
public insurance for those households eligible for coverage under 
Medicare or Medicaid (see Figure 11). Those low income households not 
insured by either Medicaid or Medicare still lag substantially behind, 
particularly for physician services use. Many of the differences in 
use of dental, physician, and hospital services by income groups are 
due to the lack of insurance. As late as 1976, for example, 88% of the 
population had medical insurance, while only 18% had dental 
insurance. 64 One researcher comments: 
• • • dental services are least apt to be covered by existing 
financing mechanisms and it is this service for which the 
greatest inequities in use by family income ••• continue(s) to 
persist. 65 
Although dental care is still generally not covered by insurance, 
research shows that persons with any type of health insurance are more 
likely to see a dentist than those who are uninsured. 66 Third party 
coverage notably attenuates income differences and may even reverse the 
effects of poverty on use, especially for services use initiated by the 
patient. 67 
Source of Medical Care 
A distinction is made between an appropriate and an inappropriate 
source of usual medical care. The only appropriate source of medical 
care is a physician's office. An inappropriate source of care is 
defined as either no reported source of usual care, or use of a 
hospital emergency room, hospital outpatient clinic, public health 
clinic or company clinic for routine treatment. 
Different patterns of health care access emerge for the poor than 
68 for other income groups. Findings suggest that the lower use rates 
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found for the poor may be due to inadequacies in the health system they 
69 
use. The system that serves the poor is characterized by uneven 
quality and a lack of coordination of services, in conjunction with an 
imperfect integration of the entire care system. 70 
Patterns of health care use by the poor differ from the norm in 
terms of types of facilities and services, as well as in the stability 
of the patient-provider relationship.7l Low income households are 
more likely to either lack an appropriate provider of care or to report 
an inappropriate source of care. 72 The poor are found to be twice as 
likely as the general population to go to a hospital clinic or an 
emergency room, and 14% of the low income report no regular source of 
medical care. 73 Davis and Reynolds (1975) find that even the insured 
poor do not obtain care in the same type of setting, from the same kind 
of physicians, and with the same ease and convenience as do higher 
income persons, although they are more likely than the uninsured poor 
to procure medical care, especially hospitalization. 74 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are: 
• Lower income is related to lack of health insurance, which, in 
turn, is related to an inappropriate source of usual medical 
care. 
• Income explains more variation in the utilization of health 
services than either health insurance coverage or 
appropriateness of usual source of medical care do. 
• Income, insurance coverage, and appropriateness of usual 
source of medical care account for the variation in 
services utilization: greater for dental, less for 
physician and least for hospital. 
• Households with low incomes are less apt to utilize health 
services than are households with high incomes. 
• Households lacking health insurance are less apt to 
utilize health services than are households with health 
insurance. 
• Households without an appropriate source of usual medical 
care are less apt to utilize health services than are 
households with an appropriate source of usual medical 
care. 
The Sample 
The data source for the study is a 1978 telephone survey of 1249 
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Oregon households comprised of 3521 individuals. The survey instrument 
was commissioned by the State Health Planning and Development Agency in 
conjunction with the Northwest Oregon Health Systems Agency and Eastern 
Oregon Health Systems Agency. The questionnaire was developed by the 
Oregon State University Research Center. Information was collected on 
use of health services, insurance coverage, income, household 
structure, health needs, health behaviors, and health satisfaction. 
The sample was randomly drawn from noninstitutionalized adults 
residing in the State of Oregon. The sampling frame is estimated to 
have drawn from 85% of Oregon households (approximately 95% of Oregon 
households have telephone service, but approximately 11% of these have 
unlisted numbers).75 Names were randomly selected from telephone 
directories for each Health Services Agency area (HSA's 1,2 and 3). A 
total of 2,000 hous~holds were selected, How~v~r, due to budget and 
time constraints, counties in which 12 or fewer interviews had been 
scheduled were reallocated proportionately to larger, similar, nearby 
counties (constricting selection of households to 26 of the state's 36 
counties).76 
Household interviews were conducted by telephone during June 
1978. Any available responsible adult was selected as the respondent; 
the respondent was asked to provide information about each individual 
household member and about the household as a whole. Each interview 
averaged an hour in length. As many as twenty callbacks were made, if 
necessary. The completed sample of 1710 households resulted in a 73% 
response rate. 77 Of the nonresponses, 59% (N=272) were refusals, 
with the remaining 41% (N=189) being households that could not be 
reached after repeated attempts. 78 Comparisons of age and sex 
distributions for the sample are relatively similar to those for the 
general population. Differences for age groups between HSA 2 and the 
1970 census are, while considerable, likely to have negligible effects 
on data-based statistical estimates. 79 
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All surveys have limitations. Telephone interviews, while 
enabling more interviews with more kinds of households than possible 
with face-to-face interviews, are less controllable. This raises the 
potential danger of nonresponse and lessens the interviewer's ability 
to check the information's veracity. The interviewer must accept 
reported information without checking receipts or other written 
information. As with all survey types, when one respondent is selected 
to report data for other household members, the additional danger of 
selective perception or lack of accurate knowledge as to other members' 
behaviors and health needs, etc., must be considered. 
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In particular, the use of telephone listings as the basis for a 
sampling frame may result in certain household types being under sampled 
or not sampled at all. Among these are the poor, the highly mobile, 
and those without listed numbers. The poor and extremely mobile are 
estimated to constitute the majority of the 5% of households missing 
from the sampling design. 80 Because households lacking telephone 
service include the poorest of the poor who presumably face the 
greatest obstacles to use of health services, findings of this study 
may understimate the gravity of the hypothesized barriers. Expected 
differences between use patterns of Health Policy Gap households and 
other households would then likely be also underestimated. 
Methods of Analysis 
Multiple methods of analysis were employed to examine the data 
from several perspectives and to elicit descriptive information in an 
intuitive extension of Webb, Campbell, Schwarz, and Sechrest's (1966) 
th d f t · l' 81 me 0 0 r1angu at10n. Cross-tabular procedures were applied to 
investigate the interrelationship of income, insurance, and source of 
care. Multiple linear regression and partial correlation methods were 
used to select as control variables household characteristics highly 
correlated with each measure of health services use. Analysis of 
variance and multiple classification analysis were used to develop 
profiles of health services use. These last techniques allowed an 
examination of the relationship of each policy variable and health 
measure, while applying increasing levels of statistical control. The 
initial bivariate relationship was studied in isolation; it was then 
studied while controlling for the other policy variables, and finally 
while controlling for both the other policy variables as well as 
selected household characteristics variables. 
SUMMARY 
44 
The focus of this chapter was to develop a model to measure the 
relative separate and combined barrier effects of low income, lack of 
health insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical care on Health 
Policy Gap households' use of health services. A behavioral model of 
health services utilization was proposed, and independent variables 
were classified as either policy or control. Finally, the hypotheses 
were set forth and a description was given of the data source, sampling 
limitations, and methods of analysis. 
The next chapter discusses study findings on the relative barrier 
effects of the policy variables, as well as the specific effects of low 
income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care on 
utilization profiles for householas in the Health policy Gap. 
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CHAPTER III 
PATTERNS OF UTILIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 
BY HEALTH POLICY GAP HOUSEHOLDS 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to explore the causal 
linkage between the policy variables (income, medical insurance 
coverage, and source of medical care); to test the relative magnitude 
of the policy variables' on use of health services; and to examine the 
barrier effects of low income, lack of health insurance, and an 
inappropriate source of medical care. 
A temporal/causal order is assumed among the policy variables in 
which income acts as an independent variable on insurance coverage, 
which in turn acts on source of care (see Figure 12). Within the 
subset of policy variables, source of care is treated as a dependent 
variable. When the policy variables are entered into the larger model 
developed in this chapter, source of care is treated as an independent 
variable on the premise that at least part of its impact on use of 
services is separate from that which is due to income and insurance. 
The same reasoning applies to insurance coverage, which is considered 
to be antecedent to income, yet precedent to source of care. 
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MEDICAL SOURCE OF 
INCOME ----->~ INSURANCE -------:::>~MEDICAL CARE 
Figure 12. Causal model relationships of the policy variables of 
income, medical insurance and source of medical care. 
A behavioral model of health services utilizati~i~ is constructed 
to integrate the policy variables, measures of health services, and 
selected household characteristics. The latter includes factors such 
as personal health behaviors, age, sex, and lifestyle stability, which 
are associated with levels of health services use. They are 
incorporated into the model as statistical controls on the 
relationship of the policy to the dependent use of measures. This 
avoids the problem of attributing observed levels of use entirely to 
income, for example, when they may, in fact, be due to other factors 
(such as excessive smoking). The control variables include measures 
of household structure, need for health services, residential 
mobility, and health behaviors (see Figure 13). 
---l ,n __ MEASURES OF HEALTH 
(HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERIS'fICS ) POLICY VARIABLES ')1 SERVICES USE 
HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE 
- Age, Sex, Size, Type 
HEALTH NEED 
- Health Conditions, 
Health Rating, Satisfac-
tion With Household 
Health, Activity and Bed-
Restricted Days 
RESIDENTIAL MOBILI'fY 
- Number of Years in 
Dwelling Unit and 
Community 
HEALTH BEIfAV IORS 
- Smoking, Drinking and 
Regular Exercise 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 
SOURCE OF MEDI CAL CARE 
DENTAL 
- Number of visits 
PHYSICIAN 
- Number of Visits, 
Use of Telephone 
For Advice, Pre-
ventive Exams 
HOSPITAL 
- Hospital Inpatient 
Figure 1]. Causal model of health services utilization. 
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The study investigates six hypotheses. The first explores the 
causal relationship of income, insurance coverage, and source of 
care. The next two examine the relative effects of the policy 
variables on use of health services. The last three test the barrier 
effects of low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source 
of care upon patterns of use. 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP OF INCOME, INSURANCE COVERAGE 
AND SOURCE OF CARE 
The introductory hypothesis is: 
Low income is related to lack of medical insurance, which, in 
turn, is related to an inappropriate source of medical care. 
This hypothesis is explored by inspecting the association between 
income and insurance coverage, and income and source of care. The 
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relationship between insurance and source of care is then investigated, 
with income held constant to ascertain whether or not insurance has an 
independent effect on source of care. The analysis begins by looking 
at income, insurance, and source of care data. 
Low income persons comprise 18.1% of the total sample (N=334l) 
(see Table III); lower middle income persons ($10,000 to $14,999) 
constitute 19.2% of the sample, and upper middle income persons 
($15,000 to 24,999) make up 39.0%. High income persons ($24,000 or 
more) total almost a quarter (23.7%) of the sample. 
TABLE III 
PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS BY MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 
AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Insurance Less than $10,000 to $15,000 to $25,000 
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Coverage $10,000 $14,999 $24,999 or more Total 
Non-Insured 18.7% 7.5% 5.7% 4.8% 8.2% 
Insured 81.3% 92.5% 94.3% 95.2% 91.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(605) (641) (1302) (793) (3341) 
(X2=112.21, p=.OO) 
Since all household members are considered to be insured even if 
only one member reports coverage, the findings are likely to 
overestimate the extent of actual insured among the sample. l 
Despite this conservative bias, 10.1% of all Oregonians sampled report 
no private insurance coverage (N=338). When estimates of public 
health insurance (Medicaid and Medicare) are included, the estimate of 
persons totally without insurance drops to 8.2%.2 
Within income classes, nearly one in five (18.7%) of the low 
income live in households without insurance coverage, which is two to 
four times the incidence of lack of insurance reported for other 
income classes. Only 7.5% of lower middle income persons, 5.7% of 
upper middle income persons, and 4.8% of high income persons are not 
insured. The data reveals a positive relationship between income and 
insurance coverage. As income rises, the probability of a household's 
having at least one member insured increases dramatically. 
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Twelve percent of household members, or approximately one in 
eight, reports an inappropriate source of medical care. 
Within income classes, almost thirteen percent (12.5%) of the low 
income, nearly fifteen percent (14.5%) of the lower middle income, 
approximately twelve percent (11.8%) of the upper middle i~come and 
slightly more than ten percent (10.1%) of the high income report an 
inappropriate source of medical care (see Table IV). No association 
emerges between income and source of care. 
TABLE IV 
PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS BY SOURCE OF MEDICAL CARE 
AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Source of Less than $10,000 to $15,000 to $25,000 
Usual Care $10,000 $14,999 $24,999 or more 
Not 
Appropriate 12.5% 14.5% 11.8% 10.1% 
Appropriate 87.5% 85.5% 88.2% 89.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(559) ( 622) (1239) (751) 
(X 2=6.28, p=.099) 
Insurance coverage and appropriateness of source of care are 
connected (see Table V). Twelve percent (12.1%) of the uninsured also 
lack an appropriate source of care. At this point a caution must be 
issued: inappropriate source of care may be due to the household's 
inability to obtain insurance which enables it to secure an 
appropriate source of care, or it may be due to the household's not 
attaching importance to either insurance coverage or to source of 
care. That insurance coverage and source of care are related is 
evident: almost one in four individuals (24.3%) in uninsured 
households report an inappropriate source of care as contrasted with 
only one in nine individuals (11.0%) in insured households. 
TABLE V 
MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE BY USUAL SOURCE 
OF MEDICAL CARE 
Usual Source Medical Insurance Coverage 
of Medical Care None Insured Total 
Not 
Appropriate 24.3% 11.0% 12.1% 
Appropriate 75.5% 89.0% 87.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(267) ( 3046) (3313 ) 
(X 2=42.84, p=.OO) 
The explanation that difficulty in obtaining insurance may cause 
difficulty in securing an appropriate source of care is supported by 
the data. The relationship between insurance and source of care is 
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not affected by economic class. Sixteen percent (16.3%) of low income 
uninsured persons mention an inappropriate source of care as compared 
with only 11.7% of insured low income persons (see Table VI). 
Similarly, 34.3% and 28.9% of the upper middle and high income, 
respectively, are found to have an inappropriate source of care as 
compared with an appropriate source of care (10.4% and 8.9%). 
Income, as hypothesized, is found to have a significant 
relationship to insurance coverage. Table III shows that persons in 
low income households are twice as likely to be uninsured as those in 
lower middle income households, and almost three times as likely as 
those in upper middle and high income households. A possible 
explanation is that higher income households contain employed adults 
who obtain employment-related coverage for themselves and their 
dependents, while adults in low income households tend either to be 
unemployed or to work in jobs not offering employee health insurance 
coverage (i.e., seasonal, domestic and/or minimum wage occupations). 
TABLE VI 
PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS WITH AN INAPPROPRIATE SOURCE 
OF MEDICAL CARE BY MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 
CONTROLLING FOR HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Inappropriate 
Source of Care Medical Insurance Coverage 
by Household Income None Insured Total 
Under $10,000 16.3% 11.7% 12.5% 
$10,000 to 14,999 18.2% 14.2% 14.5% 
$15,000 to 24,999 34.3% 10.4% 11.8% 
$25,000 or more 28.9% 8.9% 9.9% 
Although income has no direct effect on source of care, it is 
58 
clearly related to insurance coverage, as are the effects of insurance 
coverage on source of care. More than two times as many of the 
uninsured have an inappropriate source of medical care than do the 
insured. This finding persists even after possible income effects are 
ruled out by inspecting insurance coverage and source of care within 
income classes. Almost one and a half times as many uninsured low 
income persons have an inappropriate source of care as do insured low 
income persons. 
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME, INSURANCE AND SOURCE OF CARE 
TO EXPLAINED VARIANCE IN HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION 
The relative effect of income, insurance, and appropriateness of 
source of medical care on use of health services are investigated in 
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the following hypotheses: 
• Income explains more variation in the utilization of health 
services than insurance coverage or appropriateness of source 
of medical care do; and 
• Income, insurance coverage, and appropriateness of source of 
medical care explain the most variation in dental services 
utilization, less for physician services utilization and the 
least for hospital services utilization. 
Income, then, explains more variation in the use of health 
services than do insurance or source of care because of its primary 
causal/temporal position within the subset of policy variables. This 
assumption has implications for policymaking; policy interventions at 
earlier points in the causal process should have more encompassing 
effects, both direct and indirect, on patterns of utilization than 
intervention later in the process. This early intervention should 
produce more targeted results on services use. 3 
Dental, physician, and hospital services vary in terms of the 
control over use afforded consumers relative to providers. The 
household retains most control over the use of dental services, less 
for physician services, and least for hospital services (see Figure 5). 
Conversely, the provider controls most decisions over use of hospital 
services, less for physician services, and least for dental services. 
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The continuum of consumer-provider control over services use depends on 
several factors, among which are the immediacy and seriousness of 
health need and areas of decisionmaking traditionally assigned to 
either the consumer or provider in the American health care system. 
An examination of the above hypotheses begins by the development 
of a correlation matrix. Zero-order correlations of dependent, policy, 
and control variables are examined for high correlations (.6 and above) 
to determine whether any control variables overlap enough to drop those 
less theoretically useful and whether any dependent variables should be 
collapsed into a common measure. As can be seen by Table VII, none of 
the dependent measures of health services hold more than 2% of their 
variance in common, indicating that, even for submeasures of the same 
health service, different factors may account for patterns of 
utilization. As a result of their dissimilarities, the dependent 
variables are examined separately. 
Income, insurance, and source of care have very low inter-
correlations; the highest is .18 for income and insurance, with 
approximately 3% variance commonality. Although these correlations are 
higher than for the dependent variables, none warrants the development 
of a common measure, especially in light of their varying implications 
for policymaking. 
Household characteristics have generally low inter-correlations, 
ranging from .00 to .61. Age is moderately related to household size 
(-.52) and to number of health conditions (.61). Years in the 
community is related to years in the dwelling unit, as expected (.54). 
Submeasures of each category of household characteristics (structure, 
health need, residential mobility, and health behaviors) differently 
TABLE VII 
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" " 
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SoiOkI:tJ (5.) .00 .01 -.0) .16 -.O} -.01 .00 -.OJ .11 .os .06 -.01 .01 .02 .09 -.10 -.01 -.01 -.02 1.00 
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predict the utilization measures. Therefore, none are dropped. 
Instead, the relationship of health services, policy variables, and 
household characteristics are individually examined in a set of 
regression equations. 
Series of blocks of variables are entered separately for each 
health service in the order of their theoretical importance. The 
policy variables are entered first to discern their contributions 
(both separately and collectively) to explained variance for each 
health service measure. Then, in line with the behavioral model, the 
household structure variables of age, sex, household type, and 
household size are entered as a group in the second step. 
Health need variables, found to be the largest predictors in the 
literature on health services utilization, are entered as a group in 
the third step. These include the number of bed-restricted days due 
to illness, number of activity-restricted days due to illness, number 
of ill-health conditions, individual health ratings, and degree of 
satisfaction with household health on the part of the respondent. 
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Residential mobility variables, number of years in the community, 
and number of years in the unit are entered in the fourth step. 
Finally, health behaviors which might conceivably affect use of health 
services are entered. Resulting regression coefficients (standardized 
Betas) and cumulative coefficients of determination (R2) for each 
measure examined are shown in Table VIII. 
As anticipated, the policy variables do not have large Betas, nor 
do they explain a large proportion of variation in each dependent 
measure compared with the household characteristics. Yet they remain 
significant even after household and individual characteristics known 
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TABLE VIII 
rux:;RESSION BETAS AND CUMULATIVE R2 
Independent Variables Health Services Measures 
~ Ph~sician HosEital 
t of /I of 
Visits ~ phone Use Exam In-Patient 
I. Polic~ Variables 
Income .15 
-
.05 .10 
-
.08 - .05 
Medical Insurance .03 .05 • .06 .12 
Source of Care • .05 .10 .06 .04 
Step 1: Cumul R Squared .03 .01 .02 .01 .02 
II. Control Variables 
Household Structure 
Age - .03 .05 - .15 .50 * 
Sex 
-
.03 
-
.06 
-
.03 
-
.11 - .03 
Type 
- • 04 • - .04 - .04 • 
Size • • .10 - .14 .09 
Step 2: Cumul R Squared .03 .01 .07 .35 .03 
Health Need 
Bed-Restricted Days * .35 .03 • .09 
Activity-Restricted Days * .12 .03 .04 .13 
Health Conditions * .12 .12 .13 .07 
Individual Health Rating * - .10 * - .03 * 
Household Health Rating * .05 - .13 * - .05 
Step 3: Cumul R Squared .03 .21 .11 .37 .07 
Residential Mobilit~ 
Yrs in Community * • * * .05 
Yrs in Dwelling Unit .05 • - .03 - .10 * 
Step 4: Cumul R Squared .03 .21 .11 .38 .07 
Health Behaviors 
! Packs Cigarettes Smoked * * * .03 * 
Frequency of Drinking .04 * * .07 * 
/I Drinks at One Time * * * .09 * Regular Exercise .07 * - .04 .07 .05 
Step 5: Cumul R Squared .04 .21 .11 .40 ,07 
• Not significant at p ~.os. 
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to be strongly related to use of health services are entered into the 
equation. The argument is made that the persistence of these findings 
constitutes policy-mutable barriers to appropriate and equitable 
utilization of dental, physician and hospital services. 
The various Betas (standardized multiple regression correlation 
coefficients) and cumulative R2 ,S are displayed in Table VIII. 
Income is a significant predictor of use across all services. 
Insurance and source of care are also statistically significant across 
most services. 
Dental Services 
Income is the largest predictor among the policy variables of 
dental services use, and indeed, of all independent variables entered 
into the equation. Its Beta is .15, compared with .03 for insurance. 
Source of care is not a significant predictor for dental services 
because dental and medical services are not generally obtained from the 
same source in this country, with the exclusion of prepaid health care 
plans such as Kaiser. Altogether, both the policy and household 
characteristics account for only approximately 4% of the total variance 
in use of dental services. 
Physician Services 
All three policy variables are significant predictors of number of 
physician visits. Income has a negative relationship to number of 
visits; i.e., those with low incomes tend to see physicians more 
often. Insurance coverage and an appropriate source of care are 
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positively associated with number of visits to a physician. All three 
variables have equally large correlation coefficients. Household 
characteristics emerge, as expected, as strong predictors for the 
number of physician visits. This finding is especially true for the 
variable of number of bed-restricted days. Total R2 increases to 
twenty-one percent of the explained variation in number of physician 
visits. The policy variables contribute a small but significant part 
of the total explained variance. 
Hospital Services 
Income has a weak negative relationship to use of hospital 
services (Beta = -.05). Insurance is the most powerful policy 
predictor, with a Beta of .12. An appropriate source of care is also 
positively related to hospital services use, though of less importance 
than insurance (Beta = .04). 
PATTERNS OF HEALTH SERVICES USE 
The hypothesized barriers of low income, lack of insurance, and an 
inappropriate source of care are predicted to depress use of health 
services in the following ways: 
• Members of lower income households use fewer health 
services than do members of higher income households; 
• Members of uninsured households use fewer health services 
than members of households in which at least one person is 
insured; and 
• Members of households without an appropriate source of 
usual medical care use fewer health services than do 
members of households with an appropriate source of care. 
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Use profiles of Health Policy Gap households are drawn by 
examining mean levels of use of each service (dental, physician and 
hospital) by each policy variable (income, insurance, and source of 
care). For example, the profiles show the average number of times each 
household member has seen the dentist in the past twelve months for 
households of different incomes (see Figure 14). 
Analysis of variance is employed to check for statistically 
significant relationships (p=.05 or less) of the policy variables to 
the dependent measures of services use. It is also used to check for 
interactions among the policy variables. Multiple classification is 
then applied, both to find mean levels of service use by each policy 
variable and to sift out the effects of the control variables on the 
dependent measures from the effects of the policy variables on the 
dependent meaures. In this manner, successive statistical tiers of 
control are applied to the initial bivariate relationship of the policy 
variable and the measure of use. 
Each measure of services use is initially contrasted with each 
policy variable and is then viewed again while controlling for the 
effects of the other two policy variables. Finally, the relationship 
is tested holding constant the effects of the other two policy 
variables as well as the selected household characteristics variables. 
The latter are chosen on the basis either of having been found to 
contribute most to the variation in the particular health service 
measure, or of having been most effective in decreasing the zero-order 
correlations of the policy variables with the dependent measures (see 
Tables IX and X). 
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Across all health services, members of Health policy Gap 
households exhibit a distinct profile of use when contrasted with 
profiles of other households. 
Dental Services 
Use of dental services is measured by the number of times 
household members are said to have seen the dentist 
70 
during the past twelve months. Household characteristics used as 
control variables in the analysis include age of household member, 
household type, residential mobility (number of years in the dwelling 
unit), and frequency of drinking. As anticipated, the policy variables 
less directly related to use of dental services, medical insurance, and 
source of usual medical care, do not significantly differentiate among 
individuals' levels of service use (see Figure 14). 
Those with an inappropriate source of medical care report an 
average of 1.42 dental visits per year, versus 1.48 dental visits for 
those with an appropriate source of care. When the relationship is 
adjusted for the other policy variables of incomp. and insurance, both 
those with and those without an appropriate source of medical care 
average of 1.47 dental visits yearly. When both the other policy 
variables and selected household characteristics are controlled for, 
those with an inappropriate source of care average only slightly more 
visits yearly (1.49) than those with an appropriate source of care 
(1. 47) • 
Uninsured persons report only 1.18 dental visits on the average, 
compared with 1.51 visits for persons in households with at least one 
household member insured. After adjusting for income and source of 
care, the uninsured's average number of dental visits rises to 
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1.31, while the average number of visits of the insured remains 
approximately the same (1.51). The gap narrows further when household 
characteristics are held constant. Average number of dental visits for 
the uninsured increases to 1.36, and insured individuals' dental visits 
decrease to 1.48. The difference is not statistically significant. 
Use of dental services by income shows a positive and linear 
relatio'nship. As income rises, the mean number of dental visits also 
rises. The average number of dental visits for the low income is 1.10; 
the average is 1.25 for the lower middle income, 1.54 for the upper 
middle income, and 1.84 for the high income. When source of care and 
insurance are taken into account, this gap narrows to only 1.12 for the 
low income, remains at 1.25 for the lower middle income and 1.54 for 
the upper middle income, and drops only slightly to 1.83 for the high 
income. 
Even after controlling for selected household characteristics, the 
low income average only 1.16 dental visits versus 1.22 for the lower 
middle income, 1.53 for the upper middle income, and 1.81 for the high 
income. Clearly, the low income fall far short of other income classes 
in their use of dental services. The lower middle income also report 
fewer than the average of 1.47 dental visits reported for the sample as 
a whole. 
Physician Services 
Use of physician services is explored for three measures. The 
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first is the number of visits to a physician in the prior twelve 
months, Household characteristics used as controls include sex, numb~~ 
of bed-restricted days due to ill health, number of activity-restricted 
days due to ill-health, number of ill-health conditions, and overall 
rating of each member's health. 
The second measure is whether the household is reported as having 
used the telephone to contact a physician for advice during the past 
twelve months. Household variables held constant in the analysis 
include age, household size, number of health conditions, satisfaction 
with household health, and, a report of regular exercise by at least 
one household member. 
The third measure is whether or not the household member is 
reported as having had any of five preventive health exams (Pap smear, 
prostate, blood pressure, blood sugar or breast exam) during the last 
year. Age, sex, household size, number of ill-health conditions, and 
quantity of liquor consumption are control variables. 
Income, insurance, and source of care all show different patterns 
of physician services use. Although insurance coverage is not 
statistically significant for two of the three measures, and source of 
care for none of the three measures, all policy variables decrease use 
of physician services. 
Income, insurance coverage, and source of care are all significant 
demarcators of visits to the physician. Persons in the sample visited 
the physician an average of 3.40 times during the prior year. Adjusted 
for the effects of other variables, this statistic contrasts sharply 
with the respective 2.99, 2.21, and 2.89 mean visits to the physician 
by the low income, the uninsured, and those without an appropriate 
source of care. 
The low income at first appear to use more physician services on 
the average than any other income group. They report a mean of 3.76 
physician visits compared with 3.74 for the lower middle income, 3.41 
for the upper middle income, and 2.84 for the high income as shown in 
Figure 15. 
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The low income use even more physician visits when source of care 
and insurance coverage are held constant. Mean use climbs to 3.97 
visits per year, while that of the lower middle income stays relatively 
the same, visits by the upper middle income drop to 3.36, and visits by 
the high income decrease to 2.76. 
Initially, it appears that the low income overutilize services. 
But when household structure and health need are considered, the 
average number of physician visits by the low income drops 
precipitously below that of other income groups. They then average 
only 2.99 visits, compared with 3.36 for the lower middle income, 3.69 
for the upper middle income, and 3.24 for the high income. Controlling 
for household characteristics reverses the initial pattern of 
overuti1ization by the low income to one of underuti1ization relative 
to other income groups. 
When physician visits are analyzed in terms of insurance coverage, 
the gap widens. The uninsured, even after adjusting for other 
variables, still visit the physician only 2.21 times per year versus 
the insured's reported 3.52 visits. Lack of insurance constitutes a 
greater obstacle to use of physician visits than do either source of 
care or income. 
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Figure 15. Mean number of times household members saw a physician during the 
past year by income, medical insurance coverage, and appropriateness of source 
of medical care controlling for the other policy variables and household 
characteristics (structure and health need). 
*Not significant at p~.05 
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Source of care shows a pattern in which each successive level of 
control applied to the bivariate relationship of the policy variable 
and measure of use decreases, but does not erase, a significant gap 
among levels of use. Those without an appropriate source of care then 
average 2.89 physician visits, as opposed to 3.47 visits for those 
with an appropriate source of care. 
Household use of the telephone for physician's advice is the 
second measure of physician services. Income and insurance coverage 
(but not source of care) are statistically significant predictors of 
this measure of use. Thirty-eight percent of all persons reside in 
households which have contacted the physician by telephone in the past 
year. After holding other factors constant, this figure may be 
compared with the 33% and 34% of low income and lower middle income 
persons, respectively, who have contacted a physician by telephone. 
Of the uninsured, 34% report household use of the telephone for 
physician advice compared with 38% of insured persons (controlling for 
policy and household characteristics). This figure decreases to 24% 
for persons without an appropriate source of care, as opposed to 40% 
for persons who report an appropriate source of care (see Figure 16). 
The relationship remains stable even after increasing levels of 
statistical controls are applied. 
The last measure of physician services is whether an individual 
has had one of five preventive exams (Pap smear, prostate, blood 
pressure, blood sugar, or breast exam). All three policy variables 
are important in predicting reported exams. Applying successive 
levels of control to the relationship of the policy variable and use 
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Figure 16. Mean use of the telephone by the household by income, medical 
insurance, and source of medical care controlling for the other policy 
variables and household characteristics (structure, health need and health 
behaviors) • 
*Not significant at p6.05 
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of exams measure categorically results in a reduction, but not 
elimination, of differences among groups. 
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A pattern similar to that of income and physician visits is found 
for preventive exams. At first glance, the low income have a much 
higher reported incidence of exams (56%) than do other income groups 
(who range from 45% to 51%). After holding other policy variables 
constant, this pattern becomes even more pronounced. 4 Fifty-eight 
percent of the low income then report having had an exam, while other 
income group's use remains relatively the same. But when household 
structure, health need, and health behaviors are entered into the 
equation, the pattern reverses itself: the low income underutilize 
exams relative to other income groups. Exam use drops to 44% for the 
low income, compared with 50-51% for other income groups as shown in 
Figure 17. 
An examination of insurance coverage and use of preventive exams 
shows that 43% of the uninsured compared with 50% of the insured have 
had an exam in the past year. 
Levels of exam use by source of care also vary. Forty-six 
percent of those without an appropriate source of care have had a 
preventive exam, compared with 49% of those with an appropriate source 
of care. 
Hospital Services. Use of hospital services is measured by 
whether any household member is reported to have been hospitalized 
during the past year. Household size, number of bed-restricted days, 
number of activity-restricted days, number of ill-health conditions, 
and satisfaction with household are the selected control variables. 
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Figure 17. Mean number of preventive exams received by household members in 
the past year by income, medical insurance coverage, and appropriateness of 
source of ~edical care controlling for the other policy variables and household 
characte~istics (structure, health need and health behaviors) .** 
*Not significant at p&.05 
**Significant interactions are found among the policy variables. 
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Income, source of care, and insurance are all significant 
predictors of use. An interesting pattern'emerges at this point 
regarding income. Use of hospital services, unlike use of other 
health services measures, is described by a nonlinear relationship. 
That is to say, reported use of hospital services does not 
proportionately change as income changes. Instead, hospital services 
use peaks for the lower middle income and is lower for the low income, 
the upper middle income, and the high income. 5 The low income 
report a 30% probability of having had a household member hospitalized 
versus 35% for the lower middle income, 31% for the upper middle 
income, and 24% for the high income, even after holding all other 
variables constant, as shown in Figure 18. 
In this case, the low income have the same probability of having 
a household member hospitalized as the general sample, and the high 
income report a much lower probability than that of the sample as a 
whole. The latter finding may be attributable to the high income 
group's ability to maintain ill household members within the household 
or in alternative care institutions rather than as hospital 
't' 6 lnpa lents. 
The uninsured demonstrate the lowest probability (15%) of having 
had a household member hospitalized, while the insured report a 32% 
probability -- almost two times as high. Persons without an 
appropriate source of care have only a 25% probability of having had a 
household member hospitalized, versus 31% for those with an 
appropriate source of care. 
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Figure 18. Mean number of household members in the hospital during the past 
year by income, medical insurance coverage, and appropriateness of source of 
wedical care controlling for the other policy variables and household 
characteristics (structure and health need) .*. 
·Not significant at p=.OS 
**Significant interactions exist beween income and source of care. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care 
depress health services use. The degree to which they act as barriers 
varies by the measure of services use examined. 
Income is the only policy variable found to significantly vary 
patterns of dental services use. The low income and the lower middle 
income visit a dentist., repectively, only 1.10 and 1.22 mean times per 
year, which is a sharp contrast to the 1.47 times a year reported for 
the general sample. 
Income, insurance coverage, and source of care all affect number 
of physician visits. The low income see the physician a mean 2.99 
times per year, compared with the 3.40 visits for the sample as a 
whole. The uninsured see the physician an average of 2.21 times a 
year, while those without an appropriate source of care report a mean 
2.89 visits to the physician. Lack of insurance is the highest barrier 
to use of services, an inappropriate source of care is the second 
highest barrier, and low income is the third highest barrier. 
Household use of the telephone for physician advice is related to 
all three policy variables. Relative barrier effects for use of the 
telephone are greatest for those in households reporting an 
inappropriate source of care. They use the telephone approximately 
half as often as those with an appropriate source of care (24% versus 
40%) • 
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The uninsured and those with lower incomes also use the telephone 
for physician advice less frequently than does the overall sample. For 
the sample as a whole, 38% of persons were reported as having contacted 
a physician by telephone in the past year. Thirty-three percent of the 
uninsured and approximately the same percentage of the low and lower 
middle income, by contrast, report their household as having contacted 
a physician by telephone. 
Low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care 
decrease the probability of persons having obtained preventive exams. 
Almost half (49%) of the total sample report having had a preventive 
exam. Only 44% of the low income, 43% of the uninsured, and 45% of 
those without an appropriate source of care report preventive exams. 
The differences are small, but statistically significant. 
Although all three variables are significant in predicting 
differences in use of hospital services, 30% of the low income report 
having had a household member hospitalized, which is equal to that of 
the general sample. Here, it is the high income category which 
differently utilizes hospital services. Only 24% report having had a 
household member hospitalized during the past year. This is surmised 
to reflect the higher income populace's greater ability to maintain 
supportive environments for household members in nonhospital 
surroundings. 
Nevertheless, the low income exhibit the second lowest use of 
hospital services, with only 30% reporting having had a household 
member hospitalized, compared with 35% of the lower middle income and 
31% of the upper middle income. 
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Lack of insurance is the greatest barrier to use of hospital 
services. Only 15% of the uninsured versus 32% of the insured have had 
a household member hospitalized, even after other factors are 
controlled for. An inappropriate source of care is the second highest 
barrier. Only 25% of those without an appropriate source of care have 
had household members hospitalized during the past year, compared with 
31% of those with an appropriate source of care. Low income is the 
third highest barrier to hospital use among the policy variables. 
In conclusion, low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate 
source of care are found to significantly depress use of almost all 
health service measures examined, although the relative barrier effects 
differ by type and measure of service examined. Even after controlling 
for the effects of the other policy variables and selected household 
characteristics which might explain the relationship of the particular 
policy variable and measure, these effects persist. Low income, lack 
of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care clearly function as 
inequitable barriers to the appropriate utilization of dental, 
physician, and hospital services by Health Policy Gap households. 
ENDNOTES 
IThe survey asked whether anyone in the household was presently 
covered by a health insurance plan which paid any part of a doctor or 
hospital bill. Survey Research Center, Data Users' Guide for 1978 
Oregon Health Interview Survey, Oregon State University, Corvallis, 
Feb. 1979 (p. 10, code book). 
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2An age proxy for Medicare coverage is used to adjust the 
estimate of public insurance coverage. This is necessary because data 
was not collected in the survey for this category of insurance. The 
estimate is based on the almost universal availability of Medicare for 
persons sixty-five years old or older. 
3witness policymakers' reasoning regarding income versus inkind 
transfers of food, housing, and medical care. 
4Income and insurance coverage, as well as income and source of 
care, are found to have significant interactions (sums of squares are 
1.8 and 3.3 respectively, compared with 88.9 total explained sums of 
squares). Although statistically significant, these interactions are 
not large enough to change the clear relationship of income, insurance 
and source of care on use of the telephone for physician advice. 
5Small interactions of insurance with source of care and for 
income with insurance with source of care are found for use of 
preventive exams (sums of squares are 0.6 and 2.0 respectively, 
compared with a total explained sums of squares of 296.7). Given the 
small ratio of interaction to total explained sums of squares, 
interaction effects are relatively unimportant. 
6Interaction of income and source of care is significant for 
hospital services. The interaction sums of squares is 9.9, almost 
one-fifth of the total explained sums of squares (52.3). possible 
confusion of the findings is thus more serious here than for physician 
services in which the interaction terms amounted to a far smaller 
proportion of total explained sums of squares. 
CHAPTER IV 
ACCESS WIDENING STRATEGIES AND 
HEALTH POLICY GAP HOUSEHOLDS 
INTRODUCTION 
The current system of health care, it is contended, has only 
survived as long as it has because of government intervention, which 
has moderated the "disastrous effect of free market dynamics. nl An 
incremental movement towards increased regulation and planning has 
attempted to make attainable the opportunity for social justice absent 
in a health marketplace characterized by free trade and 
competition. 2 From this perspective, health insurance (especially 
national health insurance) is a major readjustment to the problems of 
the free market in operation. 3 National health insurance has been 
proposed by almost every administration since that of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. In the past ten years, other private or local/state 
government combinations of access to care strategies have evolved. 
Alternative delivery systems (ADS) have been proposed in an attempt to 
address the issues of cost containment, access to care, and freedom of 
choice. These include health maintenance organizations, preferred 
provider organizations, independent practioners' associations, primary 
care networks, and local and state brokerage concepts. 
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This chapter will describe the characteristics of each approach and the 
promises of increased access for households in the Health policy Gap. 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (NHI) 
The politics of National Health Insurance (NHI) focus on the 
legitimacy and desirability of governmental intervention into health 
care. Antagonists in the debate can be categorized as those who wish 
to shift medical care financing from the private to the public sector 
because they feel the private financing of medical care has led to 
intolerable inequities and those who view government financing as 
synonymous with government control and hence impersonal and inadequate 
medical care. 
Feder and Holahan (1980) assert that these polarized stances on 
NHI frequently are not objective, reflecting instead, 
Rideological predispositions towards private versus public 
administration, dispersed versus concentrated authority, and 
incremental versus radical change. n4 
Large industrial unions such as the United Automobile Workers, as well 
a~ a variety of liberal religious, service, charitable and consumer 
groups, are advocates of NHI. NHI antagonists range from provider 
groups including the American Medical Association (AMA) and hospital 
groups to the conservative Young Americans for Freedom. 5 
Aside from basic ideological differences, the major focus of the 
controversy over NHI has centered on the issue of cost containment. 
The expansion of private insurance coverage has been accompanied by 
significant increases in medical care costs, although cost escalation 
began even before the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. 
TO date, the expansion of health insurance, both private and 
public, has lowered the out-of-pocket cost to consumers, thereby 
improving the consumer's ability to pay for noncovered services; it 
has also facilitated the flow of revenue to providers, especially for 
fee-for-service providers. 6 Major changes in the health care system 
have resulted. 7 More services covered by insurance are consumed, 
and services have become more complex. These changes, however, are 
not uniform across all services; rather, they are concentrated on the 
more costly, insurance-covered ones. Consumption p~tterns have thus 
shifted towards more expensive services. To the extent this occurs, 
spiraling costs are exacerbated. 
Part of these cost increases reflect the rising cost of resources 
and changes in service quality. Part, however, reflect a monetary 
transfer to providers above and beyond what might be considered 
generally acceptable. Price changes by providers account for over 40% 
of increases in medical expenditures since 1950. Since the removal of 
the 1971-74 cost controls, price changes have accounted for 78.3% of 
the rise in health care expenditures. 8 
NHI opponents argue that expansion of insurance coverage will 
only exacerbate the recent growth in medical care expenditures. They 
argue that everyone will be adversely affected by inflated out-of-
pocket care costs and that costs will rise exponentially for 
government. Since third party insurance already pays 94% of hospital 
care expenses but only 61% of physician services' expenses, most of 
this expansion would occur in physician services. Some portion of 
these services: it is argued, will cost more than their derived 
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benefits warrant. NHI opponents are also against diverting resources 
from more productive activities into national health insurance because 
they believe to do so would hurt the nation's economic health. 
Finally, they oppose any growth of the federal budget that would be 
associated with NHI. 
Administrative and Fiscal Criteria 
An effective national health insurance program would improve 
acceSs to care, while restraining total as well as individual medical 
expenses. 9 ' One way in which to gauge the effectiveness of NHI is to 
look at associated administrative and fiscal factors. National health 
insurance can be typified by administrative control, definition and 
scope of benefits, or by fiscal criteria. If the use of financing and 
benefit provisions are used as base criteria, proposals for health 
insurance may be separated into three categories: 
1. Narrow coverage, minimal federal financial role; 
2. Wide coverage, limited federal financial role: and 
3. Wide coverage, large federal financial role. IO 
Cost of an NHI can be analyzed by total cost of the program for 
individuals, employers, subfederal government units, and the federal 
government; by costs incurred by all levels of government; or by 
federal cost alone. Narrow coverage, minimal federal financial role 
NHI's are characterized by an emphasis on catastrophic medical expense 
coverage after large deductions and co-payments. 
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Since 1974, the Long-Ribicoff-Waggonner bill, covering 
catastrophic medical costs above a certain level, has been the most 
widely known. Other examples are the "major risk" proposal of Martin 
Feldstein and the similar Brock bill. Both of these would pay all 
medical bills exceeding a certain percent of income, although the 
latter would administer a. tax credit along the same lines. President 
Carter's National Health Plan also emphasized catastrophic coverage. 
Catastrophic protection NHI proposals often provide other coverage, 
typically to specific population segments such as the elderly, the 
11 poor, or the very young. 
Other proposals provide wider benefit and population coverage, 
but still restrict the financing role of the federal government. 
Plans may either be voluntary or mandatory for both employers and 
individuals. Mandatory plans are, in effect, a taxation of the 
individual in a form that does not appear in the federal budget. 12 
The American Medical Association's (AMA) Medicredit proposal is a 
voluntary plan with extensive benefits for all Americans. This 
proposal would encourage coverage by the federal government's 
extension of a tax credit for insurance premiums which would replace 
the present medical expenses tax deduction to employers and 
individuals. 
The Consumer Choice Health Plan (CCHP), developed by Alain 
Enthoven, uses a tax credit approach to provide (with private vouchers 
for the poor) for the purchase of private insurance plans. Credits 
vary with income and actuarial risk category. Credits would equal 60% 
of the actuarial cost of a specified basic benefit plan in each 
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geographic area. In contrast to the AMA plan, CCHP includes several 
measures to prevent insurers from competing by denying or limiting 
coverage to high-risk populations. 
CCHP puts a special emphasis on sensitizing individuals to costs 
as well as benefits in their selection of an insurance plan. 
Competition is encouraged, not only in claims administration, but also 
in the delivery of care. Project Health of Multnomah County, Oregon, 
was based on these principles. Its success as a demonstration project 
has led to development of a state health proposal to provide universal 
coverage for all Oregonians. 
A mandatory, wide-coverage, limited federal financial role is 
seen in the Nixon-Ford administrations' Comprehensive Health Insurance 
Plan (CHIP). CHIP would have required employers with more than a 
specified number of employees to provide insurance. Premium liability 
would have been divided between employers and workers. In an 
aggregation approach, CHIP would have also included other groups of 
individuals such as the poor and elderly via public plans to 
effectively constitute a system of universal health insurance. 
The Kennedy-Waxman bill is another attempt to cover all groups 
through aggregation. Relying on mandated private coverage, employers 
would have been required to offer employees a choice among private 
insurance plans. Differing from CHIP, individuals not covered through 
employment would have had access to those same insurance plans. 
Wide coverage, large federal financial role NHI proposals include 
the far-reaching Kennedy-Corman bill which proposes a federal monopoly 
of the medical insurance business. It seeks to establish a single 
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national health insurance program for all Americans with broad 
benefits and no out-of-pocket costs at time of service use. It 
envisions the ~argest federal administrative component of all the 
plans so far considered. The federal government's involvement would 
range from payment of claims to all~cation of a regional and locally 
predetermined national health budget. 
Administration of a NHI 
National health insurance may be administered at the national or 
state level, left to the open marketplace, or a combination of these 
13 
approaches. The Kennedy-Corman Health Security Plan is the most 
widely known proposal for a nationally administered plan. The chief 
advantage of a national approach is that uniform policies would be 
equally applied to all citizens. Equity would be enhanced by assuring 
equal treatment of citizens in similar circumstances. This was the 
argument behind the enactment of a national Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program replacing state-administered public assistance 
programs for the elderly and disabled. Under a nationally 
administered approach, either a centralized or a decentralized policy 
could emerge. Private administrative agents could be utilized for 
specific tasks, as is the case with private insurer carriers under 
Medicare. 
Delegation of authority to state or local governments constitutes 
the second approach. Here, state and local governments could provide 
a more flexible and tailored approach to their constituencies. CHIP 
proposed to rely most heavily on state administration. States would 
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have had the responsibility to operate insurance plans for the poor, 
to regulate the insurance market, to license providers, and to set 
rates of provider payments. Of the three alternatives, the state 
administration has received the least consideration, chiefly because 
of general dissatisfaction with early Medicaid programs' widespread 
variation in benefit levels, eligibility, and provider abuses. State 
responsibility could range from a continued role for health care for 
the poor to a financing plan for the general population. 
Under the third approach, private insurers would meet consumer 
choice in a market model. The Consumer Choice Health Plan proposes to 
rely o~ this model to provide insurance for almost all the 
population. The Long-Ribicoff-Waggonner bill would apply this 
arrangement to all but the poor and elderly. 
National administration of NHI does not assure an effective or 
uniform implementation of programs, as witnessed by the variations in 
Medicare and Medicaid implementation levels. Lack of uniformity in 
implementation may result from conflict over goals within as well as 
between levels of government. In national government, these conflicts 
are exacerbated by the brief tenures of political executives, the 
lobbying of bureaucrats by members of Congress and special interest 
groups, and civil service regulations inhibiting effective or 
. t· dm·· . f 14 1nnova lve a lnlstratlve per ormance. Finally, the very 
complexity of a national approach causes problems for managerial 
control. Responsiveness to individual needs often conflicts with 
equity through uniformity. 
The state administration emphasizes responsiveness to constituent 
preferences over national uniformity. Because the state government 
tends to be controlled by certain interest groups, it is often felt 
that those groups not included in the power structure, e.g., racial 
minorities and the poor, are harshly dealt with. 
The competency of states to administer such programs has also 
been questioned. The nature of state constitutions and limited terms 
of office often cause a fragmentation of authority. However, through 
administrative reform in the late 1960's and early 1970's, forty 
states have instituted changes in government so as to enhance public 
accountability, improve administrative capacity, and reduce the 
control of interest groups. 
The wide variation among states in administering the Medicaid 
program have been also substantially reduced. In 1970, Medicaid 
expenditures per enrollee were eight to ten times as large in the most 
generous state as in the least. IS However, six years later, states 
with the lowest per capita incomes no longer had the lowest levels of 
Medicaid acute-care expenditures. During this period, the rank order 
correlation between per capita income and acute care expenditures fell 
from .48 to .28. 
Theoretically, at least, the competitive market allows 
simultaneous satisfaction of different preferences, in contrast to the 
intentional uniformity of a nationally administered system, or the 
variation of state and local preferences in a state-administered 
system. In a market model, consumers compare benefits to costs in 
their choice of a particular product or service. Insurers under this 
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model would offer an array of policies reflective of consumer 
preferences. Proponents believe the result would be a more responsive 
and flexible system than could be offered by the federal government. 
In practice, however, variations in purchasing power, compounded 
by insurers' incentives to limit financial risk, have resulted in a 
dual system in which employer-insured consumers enjoy relatively 
low-cost comprehensive insurance coverage, while the remainder of the 
population is at a serious disadvantage. Employee groups are 
generally younger and healthier than other population groups. Because 
of the competition between providers for employee group insurance, 75% 
of full-time workers pay less for health coverage than do those unable 
to obtain employee coverage. 
NHI approaches illustrate the complexity and difficulty of 
designing a system of health insurance to meet the criteria of 
uniformity, equity of treatment, responsiveness to individual and 
geographical needs, flexibility, and public accountability. In 
contrast to these massive NHI designs are numerous alternative 
delivery systems, some of which combine source of care strategies with 
insurance strategies, or governmental involvement in a competitive 
market model. 
TYPES OF ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEM OPTIONS 
Income, insurance, and source of care have been discussed as 
isolated strategies to bring the low income population's use of health 
services up to mainstream levels. As with Medicare and Medicaid, each 
could have massive and unforseeable effects on the health care 
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system. This section will discuss innovative methods of health care 
delivery that minimize costs while providing models of access designed 
to include those in the Health policy Gap. 
Such alternative delivery systems (known as ADS), range from 
health maintenance organizations (HMO's), prepaid Group practices 
(PGP's), Independent Practioners' Associations (IPA's), Preferred 
Provider Organizations (PPO's), and Primary Care Networks (PCN's), to 
more universal integration of health delivery systems through Project 
Health's seminal brokerage concept and its extension to the proposed 
state Health Plan (SHP) of Oregon. 
Recent ADS seem to originate with groups of providers, consumers, 
and government at the grassroots level. This is a sharp contrast to 
the Medicaid and Medicare programs which were designed and 
administered primarily at the federal level as an overlay on state and 
local provider and consumer organizations and practices. ADS arise in 
response to delivery system inadequacies in dealing with cost 
containment, access, and efficiency. If organized by provide~s, they 
often seek an improved competitive position relative to other forms of 
alternative delivery systems within their marketing area. 
Historically, health care cost containment measures have been one 
of two types: those which modify existing fee-far-service systems and 
those which attempt to construct an alternative to those systems. Of 
the latter, most approaches appear to be variants of the generic 
health maintenance organization (HMO) exemplified by Kaiser'S 
beginnings in the 1940's. 
95 
However, during the same period, a number of hybrid solutions to 
rising medical' care costs appeared which do not fall neatly into 
either fee-for-service or traditional prepaid practice categories, but 
which promise to restructure the delivery of care. Many of these were 
made possible by the passage of the Omnibus ~econciliation Act of 
1981, which gave states far greater authority to pursue nontraditional 
alternatives to health care delivery.16 
These varying models of health care delivery systems differ in 
several key respects, including enrollment options, the way in which 
professional participation is channelled, whether or not enrollee 
self-referral is allowed, the form of physician reimbursement, and 
responsibility for cost containment (see Table XI). 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) 
HMO's, initially developed as a means of providing medical care 
to workers and their families, have grown continually through the 
enrollment of employee groups. They have a record of delivering 
quality care at a reasonable cost to large populations and of offering 
a complete ambulatory care that minimizes problems of socio-
organizational access. 
Organizational aspects of HMO's include a set of basic and 
supplemental health maintenance and treatment services, voluntary 
enrollment by groups of persons, and a capitation system in which the 
HMO is reimbursed by predetermined, fixed, and periodic payment. 17 
Both prepaid group practices (PGP's) and independent practioner's 
associations (IPA's) are considered health maintenance organizations 
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Bnrollment 
!!!!! 
eJlployer groups 
and individuals 
Provider selected by HMO, 
Participation work on-site 
Enrollee Self-
Referral 
Physician 
none 
TABLE XI 18 
COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
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and are financed through capitation fees. The former is composed of 
three or more physicians providing a defined set of ser~ices over time 
for a fixed periodic prepayment. A PGP differs from an IPA in that 
physician participation in the former case is restricted through the 
selection of a closed panel of physicians who are reimbursed on a 
capitation or salary basis and who are held responsible for providing 
medical care to enrollees. Services are provided by physicians 
working on-site. No enrollee self-referral to other physicians is 
allowed. 
Kaiser is the most widely known of the PGP'S. Originating in 
California in the 1940's, Kaiser has since spread through the Western 
United States. 
The advantages and disadvantages of a PGP such as Kaiser are 
related to its organizational aspects and their effects on the 
consumer's access to and utilization of health care. Access to care 
is both inexpensive and covers a continuum of services from preventive 
care to hospitalization. Its disadvantage is that consumers are 
locked into the Kaiser system, which constrains their choice of 
providers. For the poor, this may mean they must travel long 
distances to Kaiser locations. Because chronic illness and low income 
are linked, many of the poor may value highly having a strong 
relationship with one physician rather than a relatively impersonal 
relationship of a panel of doctors available in a closed panel HMO. 
Evidence indicates that enrolling Medicaid eligibles into HMO's 
is difficult. Potential enrollees seem to perceive the HMO option as 
substantially reducing choice while appearing to be no better than 
other available options. However, when few other medical care 
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alternatives are geographically available or access is limited by 
provider preferences, the poor are willing to join HMO's regardless of 
their quality. 
New federal regulations limiting Medicare and Medicaid 
enrollments in HMO's to a maximum of 50% may render it impossible for 
PGP's to locate themselves so as both to serve the poor and nonpoor, 
as the former often tend to be geographically isolated in economic 
ghettos. 
In contrast, independent practice associations were developed 
between the 1940s-l960s and were sponsored by county medical societies 
to block the entrance of closed panel health maintenance organizations 
. 1 0 1nto the area. J They frequently kept fee-for-service 
reimbursement, invited all county physicians to take part, and acted 
to preserve a fee-for-service style of medical practice. 
In contrast to the prepaid group practice, the traditional IPA 
model stays within the fee-for-service system. Physicians are 
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis. Membership is often open to 
all doctors within the community, and services are provided by 
physicians in their offices. The IPA is, in practice, more variable 
than the PGP model in that self-referral is unlimited. 
Primary Provider Organizations 
Primary provider organizations are a response of traditional 
health providers to increasing competition from HMO's and to physician 
surpluses. 20 They follow a pattern of scattered provider groups 
adapting to changes in their own regional health care delivery 
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systems. Although hospitals generally start PPO's to assure higher 
occupancy rates of their facilities, physicians in at least one area 
have organized a PPO with an emphasis on outpatient care in response 
to employer interest in controlling outpatient use. 2l The only 
agreement binding participating providers and consumers is that each 
time a designated service is provided, it is provided at an agreed 
upon fee. 
Since this approach is a variant of traditional fee-for-service 
delivery systems, it shares certain common characteristics including 
provider panels, negotiated fee schedules (often with discounted 
reimbursements to participating physicians and hospitals), use or 
claims review, some form of control mechanism, a practice of no 
"lock-in" of consumers (i.e., consumers are not constrained in their 
choice of provider), and administrative and marketing arms. 22 
Administrative and costs advantages include the features of limited 
risk for providers and discounts of usually 5-20%, consumer choice, 
quick and cost-efficient claims processing, an emphasis on efficient 
practices (such as utilization control reviews), flexible benefit 
packages (i.e. consumer copayments! coinsurance! waived deductibles 
for use of preferred providers), and low administrative costs. 
Pr~ary provider organizations offer several advantages. Because 
they are an extension of the fee-for-service system, they are often 
more readily acceptable as a way of organizing service delivery to 
achieve cost containment. Satisfaction may also be higher because 
consumers have the option of choosing a provider rather than of being 
restricted, as is the case with closed panel M.D.'s. 
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Incentives are used to shape consumer behavior. Some of these 
include the waiving of deductibles/copayments or co-insurance and the 
increasing of benefits if consumers choose to receive care from a 
preferred provider. By discounting fees and monitoring use, providers 
can increase their institutional occupancy rate in areas where there 
is an oversupply of physicians or hospital beds, i.e., by making their 
system of health services delivery more competitive. 
Because most PPO's feature rapid turnaround on claims, provider 
satisfaction is higher than in most other systems. Providers are also 
protected by the minimal financial risk built into the system for 
providers who agree to the negotiated fee schedules. Administration 
of typical PPO claims is relatively routine, so the cost of claims 
processing adds little overhead. 
Payers (primarily employers or unions with Taft-Hartley Funds) 
are initially attracted to PPO's by the expected cost savings from 
discounted fees and the anticipated long range savings from 
cost-efficient practices (such as utilization reviews). The PPO 
design also offers employers the advantage of maximizing their 
influence over a group of providers through input into the allocation 
of resources spent on providing health care services to employees or 
union members. 
The main disadvantage is that PPO's are only cost effective if a 
ccmpetitive market exists and if employers and funds can effectively 
monitor health care. Wherever the consumer has access to traditional 
fee-for-service medicine and PPO's with no HMO (or prepaid) option, 
the consumer's leverage regarding the price of services is limited. 
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The consumer is dependent on the PPO to practice cost efficiency in a 
fee-for-service system. In this system, costs passed on to the 
consumer have historically risen faster than the total annual change 
in the Consumer Price Index. 
Primary Care Networks 
In contrast to PGP's, IPA's and PPO's, primary care networks 
(PCN'S), which were organized mostly within the past decade, have 
three principal characteristics: 
1) primary care physicians are disbursed throughout the 
community in solo or group practices, 
2) patients are enrolled in the PCN and assigned to a single 
primary care physician, and 
3) the network increases the primary care physician's control 
over the total medical care received by the patient. 23 
States are provided the flexibility to request waivers for the 
establishment of PCN's through the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 
(P.L. 97-35), which recognizes the growing acceptance for case 
management of long term and acute care. 
In practice, PCN's can be very similar to HMO's in that the 
primary care physician in both cases may be responsible for medical 
and financial patient management; they differ in that PCN's do 
restrict physician participation. IPA's are at the other end of the 
continuum with participation open to all local physicians. 
The evolution and growing popularity of PCN's is the result of 
three converging trends: Blue Cross/Blue Shield's selective response 
to HMO's in the 1970's, the growth and acceptance of family practice 
102 
as a specialty, and a number of developments within Medicaid. 
Pertinent Medicaid developments include recurring fiscal problems, 
difficulties in defining mainstream medicine, questionable application 
of the freedom of choice provision, a bias towards institutional care, 
excessive outpatient use of emergency rooms and outpatient 
departments, growth of lock-in programs, and' the relative success of 
government funded neighborhood health clinics. Another factor has 
been the ability of California to replace its scandal-ridden Medicaid 
system with a tightly controlled and sophisticated HMO system. 
Unlike PGP's, PCN's employ both solo physicians and physician 
groups and may also reimburse them on a fee-for-service as well as a 
capitation basis. PCN's, however, can be much more demanding than 
IPA's in terms of prospective physicians seeking entry into the 
network. In contrast to lock-in programs, PCN's do not isolate 
clients who have inappropriate behavior. Instead, all consumers 
select their own physician who manages their medical care. The 
central role of the primary care physician is the key distinguishing 
characteristic of PCN's (see Table XI) • 
The advantages of peN'S, especially for low income populations, 
are several. First, by making the primary care physician responsible 
for medical and financial management of the patient, they greatly 
reduce costs because although physicians' direct revenues account for 
less than 19% of total expenditures, they control about 75% of total 
health care costs. 24 An example of an instance in which expenses 
have been cut in this manner is the Health Maintenance Program of the 
Wisconsin Physician's Service. Evidence indicates that benefits 
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offered by this PCN are more generous than Blue Shield's 
fee-for-service package. This is because processing low cost claims 
under the latter amounts to at least half of the total cost of the 
benefit. Under capitation, these processing costs are eliminated. 
The PCN approach may then offer states the means for substantially 
increasing their low Medicaid fees to office-based physicians without 
increasing their net costs for processing and reimbursing physician 
services. 25 Other advantages are that they constrain patient misuse 
of the system by locking all patients into a primary care physician, 
guarantee clients an entry point into the system as long as the client 
accepts the conditions of membership, and are more flexible and more 
easily established than traditional HMO's because they do not require 
new institutions or large alterations in the existing relationship 
between physicians and hospitals. 26 
One possible disadvantage of PCN's is that they may encourage a 
reduction in the quality of care provided because physicians obtain a 
greater fiscal return for greater volume of patient load than they 
enjoy for providing ongoing comprehensive care for an individual 
client. Another potential problem is that primary care physicians may 
be either unable or unwilling to supervise specialists. Evidence from 
the now defunct united Health Care of Safeco (ORC) indicates that one 
of the prime reasons for its demise was that primary care physicians 
often paid after the fact for specialist services not approved in 
advance and seemed hesitant to question self-referrals by patients to 
specialists. 27 Unless the primary physician is held responsible fer. 
all care--not just primary care--the PCN has a strong incentive to be 
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less efficient and more costly than fee-for-service. PCN's may also 
foster adverse selection in either of two'ways: by selecting 
potential enrollees from the healthiest of fee-for-service clients, or 
by a systematic selection of a particular provider within the PCN by 
clients who tend to be sicker than the main pool of potential 
clients. The latter occurs when clients who tend to use more services 
or more costly services choose a specific provider more over other 
providers on the basis of long-term patient-provider relationships, 
geographic location, etc. Finally, the administrative and 
informational systems a state employs may not be appropriate or 
adequate for PCN's because they often are designed for a traditional 
fee-for-service system. 28 
PCN delivery systems have included innovative approaches designed 
to serve the indigent, sometimes attempting to integrate them into 
mainstream health care. Group Health Plan (GHP) of Northeast Ohio, 
for example, has been termed a "bridge between the private and public 
sectors."29 Begun in 1971 as one of eleven networks designed to 
provide care to the poor, GHP has successfully integrated both 
indigent and nonindigent populations into a system serving 
approximately 24,000 members. Approximately 9,000 are Medicaid 
recipients. The remaining 15,000 are covered under private group or 
government agency contracts. A client may move from Medicaid to 
employer-covered status within the program, preserving his or her 
insurance carrier and selected physician. 
Because of its origins, GHP does not have to answer to county 
medical associations and can focus on building a plan acceptable to 
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its member physicians and subscribers. This increased freedom and a 
heavy emphasis on computerized monitoring of relevant data are key 
components of GHP. 
Physician incentives and constraints aid in controlling physician 
and system risk while assuring quality care for clients. Three 
mechanisms limit physician risks. 30 These include an approach to 
catastrophic losses wherein medical practice groups are insured 
against lost costs above a certain level incurred by any individual 
GHP member, insuring that the physician will not drop a patient once 
he or she becomes expensive to serve. Medical groups are also 
rewarded by half the difference if actual per member month hospital 
expenditures are less than projected per member month projected 
hospital expenditures. Furthermore, if during a 12 month period, the 
cost of services exceeds more than 150 percent of a medical group's 
capitation fee, GHP will extend a short-term interest free loan, 
acting to reduce risks by allowing the group to carry forward their 
losses and offset them against future profits. 
A special emphasis on reducing health costs without reducing 
quality of care for the indigent is the hallmark of the Massachusetts 
Case Management (MCM) demonstration project. Ten thousand AFDC 
recipients are enrolled in the plan. In this project, case management 
providers coordinate enrollees' total care. 3l 
To date, the success of the project has been hindered by three 
factors: 1) at some sites patients can receive unapproved care 
elsewhere and they have done so~ 2) risk to providers either does not 
exist or is so limited that it has had no effect on incentives for 
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efficient practice; and 3) neither the state nor certain sites have 
data systems capable of implementing and monitoring a case management 
project. Administrators conclude that the program would be more 
effective if the following were to occur: 
• case management is operated out of free-standing clinics 
and offices, because use of outpatient clinics in tertiary 
care hospitals creates conflicting goals; 
• data systems are developed prior to the project's 
beginning; 
• patient education necessary for both marketing and 
appropriate system use is encouraged: 
• patients are locked into one primary care physician who 
bears financial and medical responsibility for managing 
all the patient's health needs: 
• quality of care is reviewed and monitored (with state 
access to records); 
• sites are accessible to client on 24-hour basis, with time 
allotted for walkins; transportation is provided if 
necessary.32 
Project Health's Brokerage Concept and Multicare 
Multicare, a public PCN in in Multnomah County, Oregon, has grown 
out of the experience of project Health. The latter is a 
demonstration project pooling public funds and brokering private 
providers' health plans to provide health insurance to a medically 
indigent population. The two major concepts behind Project Health are 
important in understanding Multicare's functioning: 1) Multnomah 
County pools all available health resources (including county funds, 
Public Health Service 330 grants, client payments and provider 
refunds); 2) the county, acting as a broker, negotiates prepayment 
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contracts with prepaid health plans and, until recently, had an 
episodic payment plan for office visits to physicians and for offering 
limited hospitalization coverage. 
Project Health claims that it allows the consumer freedom to 
choose among participating providers, involves and sensitizes 
consumers to cost by requiring copayments and premiums, and stimulates 
competition among health providers. It integrates fragmented public 
programs by pooling resources, encourages cost containment through 
prepayment, and approximates a voucher method of providing health care 
coverage by offering enrollment in competing health plans to eligible 
individuals and assisting them in making choices. 
Project Health pays a portion of the premium, (similar to an 
employer) based on the client's income, family size and selected 
Plan. 33 Both HMO and IPA providers are involved. However, in one 
instance because of adverse selection by high need clients of the 
health plan with a flexible IPA arrangement, capitation rates have 
been found to be insufficient to cover costs. Another health plan 
found it necessary to substantially increase its premium and close 
enrollment to Project Health enrollees for an extended period of time. 
Adverse selection has occurred in Project Health, because the 
sickest from that population have preferred health plans with an open 
physician panel. Also, because the poor have been responsible for a 
portion of program costs, those without immediate need have tended to 
drop out while the chronically ill have stayed, causing average per 
person costs to rise dramatically.34 
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project Health has responded to these problems by screening for 
health status and placing high risk clients into the county's case 
management system called Multicare. Multicare is a joint venture 
between county operated clinics and private providers with a broad 
range of services but with all preventive and primary care occurring 
in the county clinics. 
Health care plans are developed for each patient by a case 
manager, who authorizes and approves all care. Referrals are limited 
to specialists not available at the clinics who are carefully screened 
for high levels of cooperation, high-quality service, and 
cost-sensitivity. Providers are selected based on Project Health 
experience, establishment of referral provider panels, and ability to 
work with community providers. 
The major difference between Multicare and most PCN's is that 
once a high risk client's needs are met, that client is allowed to 
choose whether to remain in Multicare or to enroll in one of the other 
HMO'S in Project Health. Evidence shows that a very small proportion 
of the Medicaid eligible population uses a disproportionate amount of 
funds. Screening out this population and handling their health care 
in a more efficient system has important possibilities for cutting 
costs for states' Medicaid programs. 35 
Proposed State Health Plan (SHP) for Oregon 
The proposed State Health Plan (SHP) of Oregon extends the 
seminal brokerage concept exemplified by Project Health to cover all 
Oregonians. Its goals are to contain health care costs without 
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increasing current levels of expenditures by altering consumers', 
providers' and employers' economic incentives. The plan would employ 
health insurance pooling to guarantee a minimum level of comprehensive 
coverage at reasonable cost. 36 Consumer choice, prepayment for 
guaranteed comprehensive benefits, and coverage for all Oregonians are 
the key components of the plan. Estimates indicate that SHP could 
provide a comprehensive level of benefits to all Oregonians for 
approximately $1.53 billion dollars. 37 This figure compares 
favorably to Oregonians' 1980 expenditures of $2.6 billion for health 
care. The latter figure includes only partial health care costs 
provided under the existing system. (Only 59% of Oregonians are now 
estimated to have comprehensive health coverage. At least 12% are 
estimated to have no health coverage whatsoever.) 
The importance of universal coverage for all Oregonians is 
discussed by an SHP staff member in a memo to Don Clark, Multnomah 
County Commissioner: 
Equal access to health services for all Oregonians can only 
be achieved if all residents of the State are eligible to be 
enrolled in a plan which provides an established minimum 
level of benefits. The ability to enroll residents in a plan 
with comprehensive benefits at a reasonable cost can only 
occur if everyone is enrolled and the risks associated with 
treating illness and maintaining health are shared across the 
entire population. Further, if access to benefit coverage is 
to be continuous, eligibility and enrollment must be separate 
from financing of the system. 38 
Under this plan, all Oregon residents would be eligible for 
comprehensive health care benefits, including physician, hospital, 
ancillary services, and limited dental and alternative care services. 
Medicaid and Medicare benefits would be provided for, but administered 
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separately. All Oregonians would be obliged to choose a health plan from 
offered options. 
The SHP program would be financed through federal and state 
revenues, an employer payroll tax, and limited consumer contributions. 
These monies would be funneled into a State Health Financing Fund, which 
would be administered by a fiscal intermediary. Development of organized 
health plans would be encouraged by state revenue bonding and protection 
against unreasonable financial risk through reinsurance. In areas where 
privately sponsored plans are not spontaneously generated, or in the 
event existing plans are inadequate to serve low income populations, SHP 
might be expected to sanction a publicly-provided health plan. 39 
NHI, ADS and Health policy Gap Households 
National health insurance and alternative service delivery models 
offer much food for thought relative to access, cost containment and 
preservation of freedom of choice for providers and consumers. These 
proposals have varying potential for the access of Health policy Gap 
households to health care. 
Many ADS models and NHI proposals do not directly address 
existing gaps in health coverage. Instead, various models either 
incrementally add groups of covered persons with different 
characteristics, or simply choose to ignore existing gaps and focus on 
more efficient service delivery to those already in the health care 
system. For example, castrophic NHI proposals basically cover only 
those households in desperate financial straits from illness 
expenditures above a certain level. Other needy groups may be added 
on in an aggregative approach in various plans. Primary provider 
organizations are more aware of the need for more efficient delivery 
of the existing fee-for-service system to those already eligible for 
coverage within that system. 
Prepaid group practices and independent practice associations, 
although within the capitation model, tend also to focus on the status 
quo system of health services delivery. They negotiate to deliver a 
certain set of services to a prespecified group of people for a fixed 
prepayment, but do not specifically deal with the provision of health 
services to those not already served by the system. Those who are 
presently not served or who are under served by the system are 
invisible clients. They are hidden behind the barriers of low income, 
lack of insurance, and an inappropriate system access point of entry. 
Health maintenance organizations have the capacity, as do many of 
the other organizations discussed, to pull into the HMO a certain 
proportion of the under served "high risk" population. As demonstrated 
by the HMO projects, the poor, as well as the employer-insured, may be 
served within a capitation system. 
However, HMO performance in the area of enrollment of the poor 
has had different long-term results than the demonstration project 
indicated. This may be largely due to differences in incentives for 
participation. 40 Because many of those enrolled in Medicaid move in 
and out of eligibility for assistance, tracking problems are immense. 
The problem of determining eligibility and use patterns by the poor is 
not, however, limited to organizational aspects of the HMO system in 
which the poor are served: rather it is the result of nonflexible 
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eligibility requirements of the Medicaid program and lack of an 
integrated health care system. 
Primary care networks form a model that has been used with 
relative success for publicly-insured populations. The degree of 
success has depended on the primary care physician's fiscal and 
managerial skills. Multicare of Multnomah County, Oregon, is an 
example of a highly successful primary care network. 
What the majority of these approaches lack is a vehicle (e.g., 
insurance coverage) to enable the low income access to these health 
services delivery systems. Accessibility for these people is not an 
impossible feat. Project Health of Multnomah County, Oregon, for' 
example, translated a model of marketplace consumer choice into a 
highly acclaimed mainstrearning project for the majority of medically 
indigent. This project contained a special proviso program, 
Multicare, for high risk individuals who would have otherwise put too 
heavy a burden on providers. The extremely successful outgrowth of 
Project Health has been a State Health Proposal for Oregon. 
This proposal brings the seminal concept of consumer choice in a 
broke red model of pooled resources and providers to full bloom. A 
universal and mandated system of access and health insurance coverage 
is envisioned for all Oregonians within a state-administered and 
monitored system of private providers. Estimated to be less expensive 
than the current fragmented system, it also would provide a fuller 
range of preventive, medical, and supplementary health services 
(including dental care). 
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CONCLUSION 
Problems exist in making the health care system more responsive 
to the needs of disadvantaged populations. First, the existing system 
does not respond to any demand that is not stated in dollar terms. 
Second, the high risk factor and higher administrative costs 
associated with disadvantaged populations make them unattractive to 
private providers seeking to establish a better competitive position 
in the marketplace. Third, the quality and volume of services 
utilized by the disadvantaged may not be equivalent to mainstream care 
enjoyed by the privately insured. 
Under the present system, however, certain categories of the poor 
do gain access to the health marketplace via public insurance or 
through targeted health delivery systems (such as Maternal and Infant 
Care projects). Remaining low income groups are put at an even 
greater disadvantage. The increased demand on the health delivery 
system, associated spiraling inflation, and increased costs of care 
associated with insurance expansion create a tripartite health system 
in which the privately insured are assured of mainstream care, the 
publicly insured get care, and the uninsured poor are pushed aside. 
Such is the case when the disadvantaged are essentially left to find 
their way in the private marketplace as a result of the withdrawal of 
federal monies and the concurrent inability of state and local 
government to cover the gaps between health needs and available 
resources. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
OREGONIANS IN THE HEALTH POLICY GAP 
Income, medical insurance, and source of medical care make real 
differences in the ~.,ay Oregonians use health care. The majority of 
households have "mainstream" access to health care services in this 
state. But for those ten to twelve percent of state residents who do 
not have mainstream access to health care, this study finds that low 
income, lack of insurance or an inappropriate source of care function 
effectively as barriers to appropriate use of health services. Those 
affected by these three ba~riers use fewer health services than do 
other Oregonians, even given thp ~ame level of need. The barriers also 
contribute to serious inequities in access to health care for 
Oregonians. 
These inequitable effects on the health of disadvantaged Oregon 
households are, without doubt, intensified by the precipitous rises in 
unemployment and the closing of industrial and commercial concerns that 
had employed large numbers of heads of households in this state since 
the data for this study were collected in 1978. This situation is not 
unique to Oregon. It supports national findings that a large number of 
of all Americans are without appropriate health care access due to 
barriers amenable to policy intervention by decisionmakers at the 
federal, state and local level. 
Often these findings are initially hidden by the effects of 
varying household characteristics which affect health services use 
profiles. Household structure (members' ages, sex, and size and type 
of household), health care needs, mobility, and health behaviors 
obfuscate or even hide these differences in services use among those of 
different incomes, those with varying insurance coverage, and those 
with atypical sources of medical care. 
Income and insurance make up the greatest barriers to appropriate 
use of health services by households in the Health Policy Gap. The 
third policy variable, source of care, shows small but significant 
differences in the way in which members of households use different 
health services. 
The effect of source of care on use of medical services seems to 
be a function of both the prior causal variables of income and 
insurance as well as a certain unique effect on medical services use 
that is either ve~y small or is not finely enough measured to produce 
large "barrier" effects. This may result from the confounding of use 
patterns by different subgroups, i.e., extremely healthy or 
higher-income individuals who don't believe in medical care may use 
less services as do individuals facing income, insurance, or source of 
care barriers. 
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Relative Importance of The policy Variables 
Lack of income creates the largest of the policy barriers to use 
of dental services by Oregonians. Those in the disadvantaged category 
saw the dentist approximately once a year compared with the twice a 
year visits typical of the general populace. A linear relationship 
exists between dental services use and income class, with both upper 
middle and high income persons consuming more dental services than do 
the general population. 
Because only a small percentage of insurance covers nonmedical 
health services (such as dental), the connection between insurance and 
dental services use is nebulous. Kaiser is one of the few insurers 
which also provides dental services. Medical insurance and source of 
medical care are assumed to affect dental services use only if a causal 
link between general patterns of consumer behavior and all types of 
health services use is posited. This link would be necessarily based 
on underlying variables connected to both source of medical care and 
medical insurance and dental services use. Little or no variation in 
use of dental services was expected by either medical insurance or by 
source of medical care. 
As expected, all policy variables (income, insurance and source of 
medical care), were significant predictors of physician visits. Among 
these, lack of insurance was identified as the greatest barrier to 
visiting a physician. The uninsured reported fewer visits, while the 
insured reported more than the average number of visits for the sample 
as a whole. The uninsured saw a physician at more than one and a half 
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times the rate that the uninsured saw the dentist (3.52 versus 2.21 
times during the previous twelve months). 
An inappropriate source of care was the next largest barrier to 
visiting the physician. Those with an inappropriate source of medical 
care (either a public health clinic, a hospital emergency room, or 
without a regular source of care) reported fewer visits than did those 
with an established relationship with a practitioner. Those reporting 
an appropriate source of care tended to see a physician almost three 
and a half times a year versus less than three times for those without 
an appropriate source of care. 
Income showed a curvilear function for this measure of physician 
use, with an increase in mean numbers of visits to the physician as 
income level rose and then a slight drop in visits for the high 
income. 
Mean use of the telephone varied most by source of medical care. 
Members of households without an appropriate source of care reported 
only about half as many telephone calls for physician advice as did 
those in households reporting a physician's office as a regular source 
of care. 
Next in i~portance for telephone use was income. Only a third 
(33%) of members of low-income households had telephoned a physician 
for advice during the past year versus forty-three percent of high 
income households. The relationship between income and use of the 
telephone was linear and positive. 
Only medical insurance coverage was unrelated to telephone use. 
Having a regular source of care apparently ensures a closer contact and 
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monitoring of consumer needs than does the more transitory 
provider-consUmer relationship achieved through the emergency room or 
public health clinics. 
Low income, lack of insurance and an inappropriate source of care 
slightly depress the probability of having received a preventive exam 
by members of Oregon households. Members of households with low 
incomes, those without insurance coverage, and those reporting either 
an inappropriate source of medical care or no source of medical care 
all had slight but statistically significant lower mean levels of 
preventive exams such as Pap smears, breast, prostate, blood pressure 
and blood sugar. These were below the average level of exams reported 
for the sample as a whole. 
The biggest difference between mean levels of use of hospital 
services was for those without medical insurance. They averaged only 
half the probability of insured of having been in the hospital during 
the prior twelve months, even after controlling for household 
characteristics such as health care needs. 
The next greatest deviation from mean levels of use of hospital 
services was for members of households without an appropriate source of 
care. Since the possible effects of varying levels of health need were 
controlled for in the analysis, source of care was found to have a 
channeling effect on use of health services beyond that attributable to 
differing levels of health needs. 
Interestingly, the disadvantaged used hospital services at least 
as frequently as did the upper middle income class. The lower middle 
income class used hospital services the most, and the high income 
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category used them least. The latter finding may be a function of 
higher income households having more options for extended care needs 
than use of hospital days (e.g., obtaining other sources of nursing or 
chronic treatment facilities). 
A curvilinear function was found for income, as was the case for 
physician visits, with the very high income category using slightly 
less than either the lower middle or upper middle income. However, 
while for physician visits the low income still used fewer services 
than did other income groups, this was not the case for hospital 
services. If hospital services use is ranked by the probability of a 
household having had a member in the hospital during the past year, the 
upper income used the fewest hospital services, followed by the low 
income, the upper middle income and finally the lower middle income who 
were the highest users of hospital services. 
When general patterns were examined across health services 
measures, income and appropriateness of source of care were found to 
be significant predictors across all medical measures, including number 
of physician visits, use of the telephone for physician advice, mean 
use of preventive exams, and hospital services. 
Suprisingly, insurance was a significant predictor for only three 
out of four medical measures (number of physician visits, preventive 
exams and hospital services). It seemingly had no effect on use of the 
telephone for physician advice. At least for dental services use, 
income alone among the policy variables was significant in predicting 
use of dental services. 
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INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POL!CYMAKERS 
What are the implications of a study in which findings emerge that 
indicate various services are differently affected by income, insurance 
or source of medical care? One significant implication is that the 
health delivery system needs to be tailored for different services. 
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If one policy objective were to be the increased use of physician 
services, insurance would be emphasized more than income strategies, 
based on the findings of this research. Conversely, if the objective 
were to be the decreased use of hospital services for preventable health 
needs, policymakers might choose a strategy of investing in preventive 
exams via insurance, source of care, and and income combinations in lieu 
of the same resource investments in hospital services. 
Certainly, specific strategies aimed at increasing use of certain 
health measures conceivably would be more cost efficient and more 
beneficial to the consumer than investment in other strategies might be. 
The first task is to decide whether one type of intervention--income, 
insurance, or system delivery strategy would best accomplish the 
objective of increasing utilization rates across the board for persons in 
the Health Policy Gap. 
Single Intervention Strategies 
Income. Income is the first link in the causal chain hypothesized 
to affect use of health services. As shown, low income depresses all 
measures examined. Rationally, it is the primary strategy which must be 
used to raise use of health services by the disadvantaged to mainstream 
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levels. Proposals such as the negative income tax (NIT) have been 
attractive to policymakers because they offer the chance to eliminate the 
multiplicity of narrow categorical programs that now exist with their 
confusing array of eligibility requirements, administrative details, and 
cross-purposes. 
A universal income strategy leaving consumption aspects within the 
household's domain of decisionrnaking avoids the pitfalls of paternalism 
as well as eliminates the major problems involved in devising, 
implementjng and monitoring complex policy combinations. 
Income strategies may vary from piecemeal categorical programs such 
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to comprehensive 
income-assurance programs that protect all Americans against potential 
income level breaks, (whether episodic or chronic). Benefit levels may 
vary from a minimal survival level to adequate though not luxurious 
levels with commensurate increases in cost and decreases in political 
support from taxpayers. 
However, one major problem is that there are likely to be 
substantial differences in the impact of means-tested transfers and taxes 
on the work effort put forth by different groups.l Although the New 
Jersey NIT experiment found no evidence of adverse work incentives, 
Feldstein (1977) attributes the lack of findings to the short term nature 
of the experiment, to the lack of effects on the supply of par~-time jobs 
because of the small number of participants involved, and to peer group 
pressures for work effort maintenance that would not exist were the 
program universal. 
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Income intervention strategies such as President Nixon's Family 
Assistance Plan (FAP) would affect all aspects of consumption of goods 
and services, including health purchases, by affected households. 
Effects on hous~hold behavior vary in direct relation to the specific 
details of the proposal and the current economic realities in the 
marketplace. A policy strategy entirely successful in one economic time 
and place may be a complete catastrophe in another. 
The second major problem concerns the effects of a straight cash 
health insurance transfer on household consumption behaviors. An in-kind 
program (as opposed to a cash transfer program) may be desirable even if 
a general negative income tax were enacted. This would result if society 
placed a higher value on certain health consumption expenditures not 
valued as highly by the individual household. For example, under a cash 
transfer program, a household may choose to not invest in preventive 
health services. Instead it may prefer to invest more of its limited 
resources in shelter, food, clothing, or even luxuries. This is, in 
part, an outcome of the unexpected and often involuntary nature of health 
services consumption. Households are loathe to believe that they may 
need to save for future potential catastrophic illness, especially for 
medical services. In-kind programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) tend to 
direct household behaviors into the desired areas of consumption as 
valued by society. 
Given the unpredictable timing, costs, and unpleasant nature of 
future illness, it is very unlikely the household will adequately provide 
for its future health care needs. Indeed, in the short term, it is to 
the advantage of individuals to not invest in health services, 
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particularly preventative health se=vices thereby delaying both health 
expenditures and potentially frightening or painful treatments as well as 
anxiety-heightening knowledge of their personal state of health. 
Such households will inevitably become a fiscal burden on local, 
state and/or federal government. Resulting costs are shifted to the 
public sector, whether by write-offs at local hospitals, downward income 
shifts which place the household into eligibility categories for public 
assistance, or, as the household ages, dependency on Medicare. 
However, the economic reality is that a minimum income strategy 
would not enable assisted households to effectively compete in today's 
health marketplace so long as the present system of health insurance 
remains unchanged. Households would be unable to effectively function in 
the health market because increased demand from the publicly insured and 
inflationary cost increases make a minimum income supplement inadequate. 
This situation is worsened by the lack of provider motivation to respond 
to a need that cannot be stated in dollar terms. 
Buffering or brokering agents would necessarily have to be placed 
between assisted households and providers, thereby overlaying an 
insurance strategy on top of an income strategy. Furthermore, the 
overwhelming hostility to any such proposal in today's political and 
economic climate makes consideration of a universal income strategy 
practically impossible. 
Health Insurance. Insurance is the second policy mutable key to 
enhancing m9dical services use. Lack of insurance significantly 
depresses utilization for most health services. If income strategies are 
politically unfeasible, insurance emerges as a means to overcome the 
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barrier effects of inadequate income as well as existing insurance 
barriers. Considered as an intervention measure, it offers the advantage 
of greater political acceptability than do income interventions, while 
retaining most of the benefits of choice in the consumer-provider 
relationship. 
Insurance strategiE!s may range from catastrophic limited coverage 
with large out-of-pocket ~ontributions (or ceductibles) on the part of 
the consumer, or to a comprehensive floor under all Americans for 
preventive, diagnostic, prescriptive, and catastrophic long term coverage 
of health care costs with minimal out-of-pocket consumer contributions 
(e.g., the Kennedy-Corman legislation). 
various strategies have been developed, among which are innovative 
attempts by local and state governments to combine state, local, and 
federal monies to illustrate brokering approaches. The focus of these 
efforts is to provide increased access to medical care for indigent 
populations. One such outstanding effort is Project Health in Multnomah 
County, Oregon. 
project Health, previously a federal demonstration project, 
illustrates the strengths of brokering approaches in increasing the 
access of the disadvantaged to the present health system. This is 
accomplished by designing new combinations of coverage through a central 
agent, which more equitably pools resources and divides high risk cases 
across among health care providers. 
Findings of Project Health have provided a data base with which to 
design a state health insurance plan for the state of Oregon. This plan 
would cover all Oregonians under one umbrella brokering plan, providing 
an adequate level of access to health services for all Oregonians, 
minimizing costs to providers as well as consumers, and increasing 
participation of new health insurers. 
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Delivery System Strategies. The third type of single policy 
strategy would be that of changing the source of medical care to increase 
the access of persons in the Health policy Gap. An inappropriate source 
of medical care is a significant barrier, as hypothesized, to utilization 
of medical services, even after controlling for insurance, income and 
household characteristics. 
Delivery system access mechanisms have been developed most often in 
response to the health needs of narrow targeted groups of persons, often 
focussing on a specific health need, such as children's preventive and 
remedial dental care. These mechanisms vary in scope from local 
demonstration projects to community-wide, regional, or even state-wide 
delivery sources that seek to ensure that accessibility is minimally 
affected by system entry point, distance, transportation, or geographical 
barriers. 
Delivery approaches have had relative success. Community health 
centers and maternal and infant care programs such as WIC (Women and 
Infant Care) have provided community outreach to geographically 
centralized and categorically identifiable target populations. 
Unfortunately, many of the episodically or chronically low income people 
who make up a large portion of the Health policy Gap do not live in 
centralized areas, nor do they represent an easily identifiable target 
grouping. 
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National health insurance proposals have not been able to overcome 
the pressures of strong interest groups and conservative ideologies to 
date, although they continue to be a strong focus of interest to 
policymakers. Alternative Delivery System models, developed at the 
grassroots level, show promise for innovative combinations of marketplace 
competition, consumer choice, and government oversight. 
The relative strengths of single source policy interventions--either 
income, insurance, or source of care--are inadequate to tailor specific 
service increases or decreases. However, of the three, income strategies 
have the most potential for efficiently increasing access to health care 
systems for persons in the Health Policy Gap across all services. 
Insurance and source of care strategies rank second, due to their limited 
impacts on medical services use. As this study shows, for specific 
services, either insurance or source of care strategies better target use 
than do income approaches alone. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DIRECTIONS 
In economic periods of radically increased unemployment, a faltering 
of the national economy, and pervasive anxiety about the future, the 
public tends to be more cognizant of the insurance aspects of social 
spending as being potentially necessary to their welfare. It remains to 
be seen whether or not public opinion has swung towards the reinstatement 
of social services, although some evidence indicates that particularly 
for the elderly, Social Security and Medicare are politically well 
established. 
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When national unemployment as well as unemployment in Oregon, peaks 
at figures higher than have previously occurred since the Depression, 
anxiety and political pressure for protection from uncontrollable 
exigencies of the economic climate begin to grow. Again, if this public 
attitudinal change is not felt by policymakers at all levels of 
government, it is less likely to be translated into meaningful change. 
At the state and local government levels in Oregon, it is plain that 
decisionmakers are very aware of the health care needs of state 
residents, as evidenced by such efforts as Project Health, Multnomah 
County's Multicare Project, the new State Health Insurance Plan proposal, 
the Oregon Medical Association's recent plan, and the Blue Ribbon 
Committee for Health Care for the Medically Indigent. 
Combinations of strategies are indicated for increasing use of 
different health services. Various combinations of income, insurance and 
source of medical care depend on decisionmakers' underlying values, the 
relative strength of various lobbying interests, and the current mix of 
service providers in the marketplace. 
Combinations of insurance coverage linked with a regularized entry 
point into the delivery system could provide the same health services use 
outcomes as would a far larger increase in nontargeted monies focused on 
income interventions. An income intervention leaves choice of 
consumption patterns up to the household. Not every household ranks 
health care as high on its list of priorities as policymakers might for 
the overall welfare of society. Some households underutilize health 
care, while others overutilize it. What must be examin~d is the extent 
to which appropriateness of use is linked with any strategy or 
combinations of strategies. 
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Any successful policy intervention must include safeguards to 
protect the access of populations which are not financially profitable to 
serve. First, governmental subsidization (local, state, federal, or a 
combination) must be involved in the costs of providing care, and of 
administrative and monitoring functions. If left to the private sector, 
providers likely will rationally seek to minimize the problems involved 
with the higher health need, increased administrative problems, and 
lesser rates of return associated with disadvantaged populations. They 
may attempt to select healthier individuals if mandated to serve such a 
population, or seek to avoid serving them by locating in areas where high 
risk, poverty populations are not an issue (e.g., the suburbs). 
Second, universally mandated coverage of all the population within a 
particular geographic area seems necessary. It appears to be the only 
way in which the higher costs associated with low income, less healthy or 
perceived less desirable populations can be merged in with healthier, 
lower cost populations served by mainstream health care delivery systems. 
Third, strong regulatory controls over provider and consumer 
behaviors are required. This is necessary to ensure adequate control of 
utilization patterns. Rigorously designed and instituted information 
monitoring systems are necessary to provide speedy and timely system 
feedback. 
Fourth, ~ well planned and organized health care system which 
provides a comprehensive set of health services is crucial to the success 
of any proposal. This system should emphasize preventive rather than 
remedial services. 
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In conclusion, a need for a basic structural change in the health 
care system is clearly indicated. Nowhere is this more graphically 
illustrated than by the continued barriers to access to health care faced 
by households in the Health Policy Gap. Although it is widely recognized 
that national health insurance, income maintenance, and radical 
restructuring of the health delivery system remain theoretically viable, 
the practical reality is that given today's economic and political 
climate, innovative approaches to providing he-:th care for the 
disadvantaged are more likely to arise at the state and local levels. 
With this in mind, the consumer choice model, with a provision for 
an interim high risk public program to buffer private providers against 
adverse selection by conswuers, offers the widest choice to clients, to 
private providers, and to government. It provides minimal governmental 
administration compared with other universal plans and increases 
competition and provider efficiency in the marketplace. It also offers, 
through increased monitoring and system feedback, incentives to all 
involved to control costs and to utilize the system in a rational and 
appropriate manner. 
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